macOS / Mach-O reversing
When it applies
The target is a Mach-O binary, dylib, framework, or .app bundle on macOS (or a sample you can
read offline), and it is in scope (tradecraft-scope-roe, scope.txt). iOS IPAs are a different
surface — treat them with the iOS assessment flow (mobile-ios-assessment). Typical jobs:
understand a thick client, audit a persistence item (LaunchAgent/Daemon), or analyze Apple-platform
malware.
Why it works
Mach-O carries its trust model in-band: the code signature, entitlements, and load commands say
what the binary may do before you read a single instruction. Objective-C keeps class and selector
names in __objc_* sections and Swift symbols demangle to full signatures, so static recovery is
cheap — and Apple's own tools (codesign, otool, lldb, log) cover most of the workflow.
Method
- Trust posture first.
file target.app/Contents/MacOS/target
codesign -dv --verbose=4 target.app # signer, team ID, hardened-runtime flags
codesign -d --entitlements :- target.app # com.apple.security.* capabilities
spctl -a -vv target.app 2>&1 # Gatekeeper/notarization verdict
otool -L target # linked dylibs + rpath entries
Record: signed vs ad-hoc, notarized or not, hardened runtime, library validation, and any
powerful entitlements (get-task-allow, disable-library-validation, TCC-related).
- Static.
class-dump/dsdump for Objective-C headers, swift-demangle for Swift symbols,
then Hopper/Ghidra/IDA (jtool2 for deep Mach-O structure). Grep strings for XPC service names,
TCC-sensitive APIs, URLs, and keys. Objective-C calls go through objc_msgSend — follow
selector cross-references, not direct calls.
- Dependencies. Audit
LC_LOAD_DYLIB and @rpath entries — a writable rpath search dir is
a dylib-hijack primitive; note it for privesc/attack-path mapping.
- Dynamic.
lldb for debugging, Frida for instrumentation. Watch behavior with
fs_usage -w -f filesystem <pid> and log stream --predicate 'process == "target"' — file,
network, and XPC activity show up without a single breakpoint. Proxy or hook for the network side.
- Persistence & malware checks. For a suspicious sample: enumerate its LaunchAgents/Daemons
plist, install receipts, and
AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges / SMJobBless usage, then
confirm the behavior dynamically before calling it malicious.
Gotchas
- Universal (fat) binaries carry arm64 + x86_64 slices —
lipo -info, and analyze the slice
matching your analysis host.
- Hardened runtime + library validation blocks dylib injection and Frida — you need a copy
re-signed (or the target built) with
com.apple.security.cs.disable-library-validation /
get-task-allow. SIP-protected platform binaries can't be attached at all.
- Ad-hoc or revoked signatures change the verdict —
spctl failing doesn't mean malicious;
correlate with entitlements and behavior.
- Swift UI/AppKit binaries look sparse statically — the real flow lives in closures and
protocol witnesses; dynamic observation beats static here.
objc_msgSend hides call graphs in decompilers — resolve selectors via the __objc_selrefs
/ __objc_msgrefs sections.
Verify success
You can state the signature/notarization/entitlement posture, name the entry points and the
interesting logic at symbol or address level, and back the claim with a dynamic observation
(debugger state, fs_usage/log stream trace).
References
Apple codesign/entitlement documentation; otool/jtool2 Mach-O references; Hopper & Ghidra docs.
Portions adapted from reverse-skill by zhaoxuya520, MIT License.
1---2name: reverse-eng-macos3description: >4 Reverse macOS Mach-O binaries and .app bundles — codesign/notarization state, entitlements,5 Objective-C/Swift symbol recovery, and lldb/Frida dynamic analysis. Load when the target is a6 Mach-O executable/dylib/framework, an .app bundle, a LaunchAgent/Daemon plist, or Apple-platform7 malware. Signals: "Mach-O 64-bit executable", codesign/spctl output, hardened runtime,8 objc_msgSend, mangled _ZN/_$s symbols, XPC service names, TCC prompts.9domain: reverse-engineering10type: technique11stability: learning12modes: [pentest, bugbounty]13severity: medium14tools: [codesign, spctl, otool, jtool2, class-dump, dsdump, swift-demangle, hopper, ghidra, lldb, frida]15schema_version: 116metadata:17 source: https://skillmd.com/skills/noorqureshi/reverse-eng-macos18---1920# macOS / Mach-O reversing2122## When it applies23The target is a Mach-O binary, dylib, framework, or `.app` bundle on macOS (or a sample you can24read offline), and it is in scope (`tradecraft-scope-roe`, `scope.txt`). iOS IPAs are a different25surface — treat them with the iOS assessment flow (`mobile-ios-assessment`). Typical jobs:26understand a thick client, audit a persistence item (LaunchAgent/Daemon), or analyze Apple-platform27malware.2829## Why it works30Mach-O carries its trust model in-band: the code signature, entitlements, and load commands say31what the binary may do before you read a single instruction. Objective-C keeps class and selector32names in `__objc_*` sections and Swift symbols demangle to full signatures, so static recovery is33cheap — and Apple's own tools (`codesign`, `otool`, `lldb`, `log`) cover most of the workflow.3435## Method361. **Trust posture first.**37 ```bash38 file target.app/Contents/MacOS/target39 codesign -dv --verbose=4 target.app # signer, team ID, hardened-runtime flags40 codesign -d --entitlements :- target.app # com.apple.security.* capabilities41 spctl -a -vv target.app 2>&1 # Gatekeeper/notarization verdict42 otool -L target # linked dylibs + rpath entries43 ```44 Record: signed vs ad-hoc, notarized or not, hardened runtime, library validation, and any45 powerful entitlements (`get-task-allow`, `disable-library-validation`, TCC-related).462. **Static.** `class-dump`/`dsdump` for Objective-C headers, `swift-demangle` for Swift symbols,47 then Hopper/Ghidra/IDA (jtool2 for deep Mach-O structure). Grep strings for XPC service names,48 TCC-sensitive APIs, URLs, and keys. Objective-C calls go through `objc_msgSend` — follow49 *selector* cross-references, not direct calls.503. **Dependencies.** Audit `LC_LOAD_DYLIB` and `@rpath` entries — a writable rpath search dir is51 a dylib-hijack primitive; note it for privesc/attack-path mapping.524. **Dynamic.** `lldb` for debugging, Frida for instrumentation. Watch behavior with53 `fs_usage -w -f filesystem <pid>` and `log stream --predicate 'process == "target"'` — file,54 network, and XPC activity show up without a single breakpoint. Proxy or hook for the network side.555. **Persistence & malware checks.** For a suspicious sample: enumerate its LaunchAgents/Daemons56 plist, install receipts, and `AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges` / SMJobBless usage, then57 confirm the behavior dynamically before calling it malicious.5859## Gotchas60- **Universal (fat) binaries** carry arm64 + x86_64 slices — `lipo -info`, and analyze the slice61 matching your analysis host.62- **Hardened runtime + library validation blocks dylib injection and Frida** — you need a copy63 re-signed (or the target built) with `com.apple.security.cs.disable-library-validation` /64 `get-task-allow`. SIP-protected platform binaries can't be attached at all.65- **Ad-hoc or revoked signatures change the verdict** — `spctl` failing doesn't mean malicious;66 correlate with entitlements and behavior.67- **Swift UI/AppKit binaries look sparse statically** — the real flow lives in closures and68 protocol witnesses; dynamic observation beats static here.69- **`objc_msgSend` hides call graphs** in decompilers — resolve selectors via the `__objc_selrefs`70 / `__objc_msgrefs` sections.7172## Verify success73You can state the signature/notarization/entitlement posture, name the entry points and the74interesting logic at symbol or address level, and back the claim with a dynamic observation75(debugger state, `fs_usage`/`log stream` trace).7677## References78Apple codesign/entitlement documentation; `otool`/`jtool2` Mach-O references; Hopper & Ghidra docs.7980---81_Portions adapted from [reverse-skill](https://github.com/zhaoxuya520/reverse-skill) by zhaoxuya520, MIT License._