Web Auth JWT

JWT / token authentication attacks

When it applies

The app authenticates with a JSON Web Token and trusts claims inside it (user id, role, isAdmin). The win is forging a valid-looking token the server accepts.

Why it works

JWTs are only as safe as their signature verification. Implementations routinely skip it, confuse algorithms, or trust attacker-controlled key hints (kid, jku, x5u). If you can make the server accept a signature you produced, you own every claim.

Method

Payloads & full variation set: cheatsheet.md next to this file — work the set, not the first line.

1. Decode & read claims: jwt_tool <token> — look for role, admin, sub, weak exp.
2. alg=none: strip the signature and set header {"alg":"none"}; some libs accept it.
3. Algorithm confusion RS256→HS256: if the server verifies RS256 with the public key, re-sign HS256 using that public key as the HMAC secret — server verifies with the same key. jwt_tool -X k -pk public.pem.
4. Weak HMAC secret: crack HS256 offline — hashcat -m 16500 token.txt rockyou.txt; if it falls, mint any token.
5. kid / jku / x5u abuse: kid path traversal or SQLi to control the key file; jku/x5u pointing at your JWKS so the server fetches your public key and you sign with your private key.

Gotchas

• Editing claims without re-signing fails unless verification is broken — confirm the vuln class first.
• exp/nbf may be enforced even when signature isn't — keep timestamps valid.
• Public key sourcing: grab it from /.well-known/jwks.json, a cert, or TLS if not published.

Verify success

Server accepts a token you forged with elevated claims (e.g. admin panel loads, or an authenticated endpoint returns another user's data with your minted sub).

References

PortSwigger JWT labs; jwt_tool wiki; Auth0 "Critical vulnerabilities in JWT libraries".