How do I install the Cloud Kubernetes skill?

Run npx skillmds@latest add noorqureshi/cloud-kubernetes in your terminal (requires Node.js), paste this page's agent-chat prompt into Claude, Cursor, or any MCP-connected agent, or download the SKILL.md file and copy it into your agent's skills directory.

Is Cloud Kubernetes safe to use?

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Which AI agents work with Cloud Kubernetes?

This skill is tagged as working with Claude Code, Claude.ai, OpenAI Codex. SKILL.md is an open format, so most agents that read a skills directory can load it too.

Is Cloud Kubernetes free to use?

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Who published Cloud Kubernetes?

NoorQureshi (@noorqureshi) published this skill. Their other Agent Skills are listed on their SkillMD profile.

Cloud Kubernetes by noorqureshi — Agent Skill

Name: Cloud Kubernetes
Author: NoorQureshi

Cloud Kubernetes

Attack exposed Kubernetes: API server, kubelet, etcd, dashboards, and RBAC. Load on k8s signals — ports 6443/10250/2379/8443, /api/v1, kube-dns, a pod foothold, or "kubernetes/k8s". Signals: kubectl, service-account tokens, exposed dashboard, container in a cluster.

NoorQureshi 0685b37 2.1 KB Updated Sep 17, 2026

File contents

Kubernetes attacks

When it applies

A Kubernetes control-plane or node component is reachable (externally or from a pod foothold), or you landed in a container inside a cluster and want to escalate to cluster admin / other tenants.

Why it works

k8s exposes powerful HTTP APIs that are frequently unauthenticated or over-permissioned: anonymous API access, kubelet read/exec on 10250, unauth etcd (all secrets), and mounted service-account tokens with broad RBAC. One over-scoped token = cluster takeover.

Method

From outside: kube-hunter; probe API server 6443 (/api/v1 anonymous), kubelet 10250 (/pods, /run exec), etcd 2379 (keys→secrets), and exposed dashboards (8443/anonymous).
From a pod: read the mounted token /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/; kubectl auth can-i --list to see what it grants.
Escalate via RBAC: over-permissioned SA → create/exec pods, read secrets across namespaces, or create pods with a hostPath/privileged spec to mount the node (→ node/cluster takeover).
Container→node breakout: privileged pod, hostPID/hostNetwork, or a hostPath mount to the host filesystem (→ cloud-container-escape).
Loot: kubectl get secrets -A, cloud IAM via node metadata (→ cloud-imds-ssrf).

Gotchas

kubectl auth can-i --list first — it tells you exactly what the token can do; don't guess.
Anonymous API/kubelet is common in labs and misconfigured clusters — always test unauth.
On bug bounty, prove access read-only where possible; creating privileged pods is high-impact — mind RoE.

Verify success

Cluster-level access proven: reading secrets across namespaces, exec into others' pods, or node filesystem/cloud-creds access from an over-scoped token.

References

kube-hunter/peirates; NCC "Kubernetes security"; MITRE ATT&CK Containers.

---name: cloud-kubernetesdescription: Attack exposed Kubernetes: API server, kubelet, etcd, dashboards, and RBAC. Load on k8s signals — ports 6443/10250/2379/8443, /api/v1, kube-dns, a pod foothold, or "kubernetes/k8s". Signals: kubectl, service-account tokens, exposed dashboard, container in a cluster.---# Kubernetes attacks## When it appliesA Kubernetes control-plane or node component is reachable (externally or from a pod foothold),or you landed in a container inside a cluster and want to escalate to cluster admin / other tenants.## Why it worksk8s exposes powerful HTTP APIs that are frequently unauthenticated or over-permissioned:anonymous API access, kubelet read/exec on 10250, unauth etcd (all secrets), and mountedservice-account tokens with broad RBAC. One over-scoped token = cluster takeover.## Method1. **From outside**: `kube-hunter`; probe API server 6443 (`/api/v1` anonymous), kubelet 10250 (`/pods`, `/run` exec), etcd 2379 (keys→secrets), and exposed dashboards (8443/anonymous).2. **From a pod**: read the mounted token `/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/`; `kubectl auth can-i --list` to see what it grants.3. **Escalate via RBAC**: over-permissioned SA → create/exec pods, read secrets across namespaces, or `create pods` with a hostPath/privileged spec to mount the node (→ node/cluster takeover).4. **Container→node breakout**: privileged pod, hostPID/hostNetwork, or a hostPath mount to the host filesystem (→ `cloud-container-escape`).5. **Loot**: `kubectl get secrets -A`, cloud IAM via node metadata (→ `cloud-imds-ssrf`).## Gotchas- `kubectl auth can-i --list` first — it tells you exactly what the token can do; don't guess.- Anonymous API/kubelet is common in labs and misconfigured clusters — always test unauth.- On bug bounty, prove access read-only where possible; creating privileged pods is high-impact — mind RoE.## Verify successCluster-level access proven: reading secrets across namespaces, exec into others' pods, or nodefilesystem/cloud-creds access from an over-scoped token.## Referenceskube-hunter/peirates; NCC "Kubernetes security"; MITRE ATT&CK Containers.

Frequently asked questions