RF / SDR signal analysis (non-Wi-Fi radio)
When it applies
The scope includes a radio device that isn't Wi-Fi — a wireless remote, key fob, alarm sensor,
telemetry link, or ISM-band gadget — and you need to know whether an attacker can eavesdrop on,
forge, or replay its traffic. Spectrum use and transmission are heavily regulated: load
tradecraft-scope-roe and make scope.txt state the exact devices, frequency bands, and whether
transmitting is permitted at all — the default is receive-only. Classic Wi-Fi attacks belong to
the wireless domain (wireless-wpa2-attacks, wireless-evil-twin); this skill is generic SDR RF.
Why it works
Cheap SDR hardware (RTL-SDR for receive, HackRF for transmit) turns a wide slice of spectrum into
raw I/Q samples. Most low-cost remotes and sensors use simple, unauthenticated modulation
(OOK/ASK/2-FSK) with fixed or rolling codes, so the entire protocol is recoverable from a capture:
demodulate to symbols, read the bit pattern, and you know exactly what a receiver trusts. Replay
and forgery feasibility then falls out of whether the code is fixed, rolling, or challenge-response.
Method
- Confirm the legal envelope before powering anything on. Note the licensed bands, protected
services (aviation, emergency — stay far away), and the authorization reference for any TX.
Receive-only is the default; transmitting happens only in a shielded room (Faraday cage) with
written permission.
- Survey receive-only. Sweep the expected band in
gqrx (or rtl_power for a wide passive
sweep) and note the center frequency, bandwidth, and duty cycle of the target signal. ISM
defaults worth checking first: 315 / 433.92 / 868 / 915 MHz.
- Capture I/Q. Record the raw signal for offline work:
hackrf_transfer -r capture.cs8 -f 433920000 -s 2000000 (-r = receive to file, -f Hz,
-s sample rate; 2 Msps covers most narrowband remotes).
- Analyze the capture. Open it in Inspectrum to see the symbol timing and modulation
visually, then demodulate and decode in URH (Universal Radio Hacker) — it auto-detects
OOK/ASK/FSK, slices symbols to bits, and lets you diff transmissions to separate the fixed
preamble/address from the counter/button fields. GNU Radio flowgraphs handle protocols URH
can't.
- Classify the code scheme. Fixed code (identical bits every press) = trivially replayable.
Rolling code = replay fails but look for rollback/jam-and-replay weaknesses and predictable
counters. Document which class you observed with capture evidence.
- Assess replay/transmit only under the lab rules: shielded room, written TX authorization,
the target device as the only receiver.
hackrf_transfer -t replay.cs8 -f 433920000 -s 2000000
retransmits a capture — outside a shielded environment this can be a criminal offense regardless
of engagement scope.
- Report the control question, not the capture. The finding is "an unauthenticated attacker
can open / arm / spoof this" plus hardening advice (rolling codes, encryption, RX timeouts), not
a dump of RF trivia.
Gotchas
- Default to RX and write the legal boundary into your notes — which bands, which devices, TX
yes/no, and the authorization reference. If it's not written, it's receive-only.
- Never jam or interfere with public communications, and never transmit outside the shielded
lab — including "just a quick replay test" on the bench.
- Sanitize evidence: don't publish unsanitized frequency + location combinations where the
pairing itself is sensitive (site layouts, alarm frequencies).
- Rolling codes defeat naive replay — don't report "replayable" from a single capture; diff
several transmissions first.
- Sample rate too low aliases the signal away — if you can't find a known transmitter, widen
the sweep and raise
-s before concluding it's absent.
Verify success
From receive-only analysis you can state the center frequency, modulation, symbol rate, and code
scheme (fixed/rolling/encrypted) of the target signal, backed by labeled captures — and a clear
verdict on whether unauthorized control is possible, with any transmit/replay test done strictly
inside the authorized shielded setup.
References
URH and GNU Radio documentation; Inspectrum; the wireless domain skills for Wi-Fi targets.
Portions adapted from reverse-skill by zhaoxuya520, MIT License.
1---2name: hardware-radio-sdr3description: >4 Authorized RF/SDR security research on non-Wi-Fi radio signals — identify a signal's frequency5 and modulation receive-only, demodulate and reverse the protocol, and assess replay feasibility6 in a shielded lab. Load for wireless remotes, key fobs, sensors, telemetry, ISM-band devices,7 ADS-B, or any sub-GHz/RF protocol outside classic Wi-Fi. Signals: unknown RF device in scope,8 315/433/868/915 MHz, OOK/ASK/FSK captures, RTL-SDR/HackRF work.9domain: hardware10type: methodology11stability: learning12modes: [pentest]13severity: medium14tools: [rtl-sdr, hackrf, gnuradio, urh, inspectrum, gqrx]15schema_version: 116metadata:17 source: https://skillmd.com/skills/noorqureshi/hardware-radio-sdr18---1920# RF / SDR signal analysis (non-Wi-Fi radio)2122## When it applies23The scope includes a radio device that isn't Wi-Fi — a wireless remote, key fob, alarm sensor,24telemetry link, or ISM-band gadget — and you need to know whether an attacker can eavesdrop on,25forge, or replay its traffic. **Spectrum use and transmission are heavily regulated**: load26`tradecraft-scope-roe` and make `scope.txt` state the exact devices, frequency bands, and whether27**transmitting is permitted at all — the default is receive-only**. Classic Wi-Fi attacks belong to28the wireless domain (`wireless-wpa2-attacks`, `wireless-evil-twin`); this skill is generic SDR RF.2930## Why it works31Cheap SDR hardware (RTL-SDR for receive, HackRF for transmit) turns a wide slice of spectrum into32raw I/Q samples. Most low-cost remotes and sensors use simple, unauthenticated modulation33(OOK/ASK/2-FSK) with fixed or rolling codes, so the entire protocol is recoverable from a capture:34demodulate to symbols, read the bit pattern, and you know exactly what a receiver trusts. Replay35and forgery feasibility then falls out of whether the code is fixed, rolling, or challenge-response.3637## Method381. **Confirm the legal envelope before powering anything on.** Note the licensed bands, protected39 services (aviation, emergency — stay far away), and the authorization reference for any TX.40 Receive-only is the default; transmitting happens only in a shielded room (Faraday cage) with41 written permission.422. **Survey receive-only.** Sweep the expected band in `gqrx` (or `rtl_power` for a wide passive43 sweep) and note the center frequency, bandwidth, and duty cycle of the target signal. ISM44 defaults worth checking first: 315 / 433.92 / 868 / 915 MHz.453. **Capture I/Q.** Record the raw signal for offline work:46 `hackrf_transfer -r capture.cs8 -f 433920000 -s 2000000` (`-r` = receive to file, `-f` Hz,47 `-s` sample rate; 2 Msps covers most narrowband remotes).484. **Analyze the capture.** Open it in **Inspectrum** to see the symbol timing and modulation49 visually, then demodulate and decode in **URH** (Universal Radio Hacker) — it auto-detects50 OOK/ASK/FSK, slices symbols to bits, and lets you diff transmissions to separate the fixed51 preamble/address from the counter/button fields. GNU Radio flowgraphs handle protocols URH52 can't.535. **Classify the code scheme.** Fixed code (identical bits every press) = trivially replayable.54 Rolling code = replay fails but look for rollback/jam-and-replay weaknesses and predictable55 counters. Document which class you observed with capture evidence.566. **Assess replay/transmit only under the lab rules**: shielded room, written TX authorization,57 the target device as the only receiver. `hackrf_transfer -t replay.cs8 -f 433920000 -s 2000000`58 retransmits a capture — outside a shielded environment this can be a criminal offense regardless59 of engagement scope.607. **Report the control question, not the capture.** The finding is "an unauthenticated attacker61 can open / arm / spoof this" plus hardening advice (rolling codes, encryption, RX timeouts), not62 a dump of RF trivia.6364## Gotchas65- **Default to RX and write the legal boundary into your notes** — which bands, which devices, TX66 yes/no, and the authorization reference. If it's not written, it's receive-only.67- **Never jam or interfere with public communications**, and never transmit outside the shielded68 lab — including "just a quick replay test" on the bench.69- **Sanitize evidence**: don't publish unsanitized frequency + location combinations where the70 pairing itself is sensitive (site layouts, alarm frequencies).71- **Rolling codes defeat naive replay** — don't report "replayable" from a single capture; diff72 several transmissions first.73- **Sample rate too low aliases the signal away** — if you can't find a known transmitter, widen74 the sweep and raise `-s` before concluding it's absent.7576## Verify success77From receive-only analysis you can state the center frequency, modulation, symbol rate, and code78scheme (fixed/rolling/encrypted) of the target signal, backed by labeled captures — and a clear79verdict on whether unauthorized control is possible, with any transmit/replay test done strictly80inside the authorized shielded setup.8182## References83URH and GNU Radio documentation; Inspectrum; the wireless domain skills for Wi-Fi targets.8485---86_Portions adapted from [reverse-skill](https://github.com/zhaoxuya520/reverse-skill) by zhaoxuya520, MIT License._