Deep forensic artifact analysis
When it applies
Triage (defense-dfir-triage) has scoped the incident and you now hold preserved evidence —
a memory dump, a disk image (E01/raw), a PCAP, or exported host artifacts — and must prove,
artifact by artifact, what the attacker did: which process ran, what persisted, what left the
network. This is deep analysis of dead-box/dead-disk evidence, not live first response.
Why it works
Attackers can delete logs, but memory, filesystem metadata ($MFT, USN journal), and packet
captures retain artifacts the attacker never controlled. Parsing them with purpose-built tools
reconstructs execution, persistence, and exfiltration even after the live system was cleaned —
and hashing plus chain of custody makes the conclusions defensible.
Method
- Preserve before you parse. SHA-256 every image/capture, record timezone + acquisition
command, work on a copy with the original read-only. Write chain-of-custody notes into your
timeline as you go — every conclusion must trace back to an artifact path.
- Memory (Volatility 3) — situational awareness first, then chase anomalies:
vol -f mem.dmp windows.info # OS profile, build, timezone
vol -f mem.dmp windows.pslist # processes — unknown names, odd parents
vol -f mem.dmp windows.netscan # connections — beacons, lateral SMB/RDP
vol -f mem.dmp windows.cmdline # full command lines
Follow with windows.malfind (injected code) and dlllist/handles on suspects; dump a
suspicious PID (--pid <pid> --dump) for defense-malware-triage / reverse-eng-malware.
- Disk & super-timeline — run Plaso (
log2timeline.py) over the image and filter around
the known-bad window in Timeline Explorer; correlate $MFT, USN journal, Shimcache, Amcache,
and Prefetch into one ordered view. Autopsy / FTK Imager for carving and deleted files.
- Windows host artifacts (Eric Zimmerman's toolset) — the execution/persistence core:
- Execution: Amcache, Prefetch, BAM, Shimcache.
- Persistence: Run keys, services, scheduled tasks, WMI subscriptions.
- Logs: Security, PowerShell 4104 script-block, Sysmon — feed
defense-log-analysis.
- Network (PCAP) —
tshark conversation/protocol/DNS statistics first, then carve
suspicious streams and export objects. Custom protocol payloads → reverse-eng-protocol;
C2 implants → defense-malware-triage.
- Hand off — extract IOCs with confidence + provenance, map to ATT&CK, feed detections to
defense-detection-sigma, and run reporting-evidence-review before the incident report.
Gotchas
- Never analyze the original — one mount without a write blocker and the evidence is
challengeable. Hash first, analyze a copy, re-hash after to prove nothing changed.
- Timezone skew kills timelines — Volatility, Plaso, and event logs each default
differently; normalize everything to UTC before correlating.
- Wrong Volatility profile = garbage output — confirm
windows.info before trusting
pslist. Linux/macOS dumps need symbol tables (ISF) built for that exact kernel.
- Prefetch proves execution happened, not who ran it — corroborate with logs/accounts.
- Absent artifact ≠ absent activity — log clearing and timestomping are themselves
findings; record gaps explicitly instead of reading them as "clean".
- Raw IOCs can tip the attacker or leak victim data — grade and redact before sharing.
Verify success
A reviewable timeline (Time | Host | Artifact | Finding | Confidence | Evidence path) where
every claim names the artifact that proves it, before/after analysis hashes match, and IOCs +
ATT&CK mapping are ready for detection engineering and reporting.
References
Volatility 3 docs; Plaso/log2timeline; Eric Zimmerman's tools; SANS DFIR posters;
NIST SP 800-86.
Portions adapted from reverse-skill by zhaoxuya520, MIT License.
1---2name: defense-forensics3description: >4 Deep forensic artifact analysis after triage — memory dumps (Volatility 3), disk and5 super-timelines (Plaso), PCAP (tshark), and Windows host artifacts (Zimmerman toolset) —6 with hashing and chain of custody. Load when an incident moves past first response into7 "prove what the attacker did on this image": a memory dump to analyze, an E01/disk image, a8 captured pcap, or Prefetch/Shimcache/Amcache deep-dives. Signals: .dmp/.raw memory image,9 E01, pcap/pcapng, "analyze this dump", timeline reconstruction, evidence preservation.10domain: defense11type: methodology12stability: learning13modes: [defense]14severity: info15mitre: [T1059, T1543, T1078]16tools: [volatility3, plaso, tshark, autopsy, ftk-imager, eric-zimmerman-tools]17schema_version: 118metadata:19 source: https://skillmd.com/skills/noorqureshi/defense-forensics20---2122# Deep forensic artifact analysis2324## When it applies25Triage (`defense-dfir-triage`) has scoped the incident and you now hold preserved evidence —26a memory dump, a disk image (E01/raw), a PCAP, or exported host artifacts — and must prove,27artifact by artifact, what the attacker did: which process ran, what persisted, what left the28network. This is deep analysis of dead-box/dead-disk evidence, not live first response.2930## Why it works31Attackers can delete logs, but memory, filesystem metadata ($MFT, USN journal), and packet32captures retain artifacts the attacker never controlled. Parsing them with purpose-built tools33reconstructs execution, persistence, and exfiltration even after the live system was cleaned —34and hashing plus chain of custody makes the conclusions defensible.3536## Method371. **Preserve before you parse.** SHA-256 every image/capture, record timezone + acquisition38 command, work on a copy with the original read-only. Write chain-of-custody notes into your39 timeline as you go — every conclusion must trace back to an artifact path.402. **Memory (Volatility 3)** — situational awareness first, then chase anomalies:41 ```bash42 vol -f mem.dmp windows.info # OS profile, build, timezone43 vol -f mem.dmp windows.pslist # processes — unknown names, odd parents44 vol -f mem.dmp windows.netscan # connections — beacons, lateral SMB/RDP45 vol -f mem.dmp windows.cmdline # full command lines46 ```47 Follow with `windows.malfind` (injected code) and `dlllist`/`handles` on suspects; dump a48 suspicious PID (`--pid <pid> --dump`) for `defense-malware-triage` / `reverse-eng-malware`.493. **Disk & super-timeline** — run Plaso (`log2timeline.py`) over the image and filter around50 the known-bad window in Timeline Explorer; correlate $MFT, USN journal, Shimcache, Amcache,51 and Prefetch into one ordered view. Autopsy / FTK Imager for carving and deleted files.524. **Windows host artifacts** (Eric Zimmerman's toolset) — the execution/persistence core:53 - Execution: Amcache, Prefetch, BAM, Shimcache.54 - Persistence: Run keys, services, scheduled tasks, WMI subscriptions.55 - Logs: Security, PowerShell 4104 script-block, Sysmon — feed `defense-log-analysis`.565. **Network (PCAP)** — `tshark` conversation/protocol/DNS statistics first, then carve57 suspicious streams and export objects. Custom protocol payloads → `reverse-eng-protocol`;58 C2 implants → `defense-malware-triage`.596. **Hand off** — extract IOCs with confidence + provenance, map to ATT&CK, feed detections to60 `defense-detection-sigma`, and run `reporting-evidence-review` before the incident report.6162## Gotchas63- **Never analyze the original** — one mount without a write blocker and the evidence is64 challengeable. Hash first, analyze a copy, re-hash after to prove nothing changed.65- **Timezone skew kills timelines** — Volatility, Plaso, and event logs each default66 differently; normalize everything to UTC before correlating.67- **Wrong Volatility profile = garbage output** — confirm `windows.info` before trusting68 pslist. Linux/macOS dumps need symbol tables (ISF) built for that exact kernel.69- **Prefetch proves execution happened, not who ran it** — corroborate with logs/accounts.70- **Absent artifact ≠ absent activity** — log clearing and timestomping are themselves71 findings; record gaps explicitly instead of reading them as "clean".72- Raw IOCs can tip the attacker or leak victim data — grade and redact before sharing.7374## Verify success75A reviewable timeline (Time | Host | Artifact | Finding | Confidence | Evidence path) where76every claim names the artifact that proves it, before/after analysis hashes match, and IOCs +77ATT&CK mapping are ready for detection engineering and reporting.7879## References80Volatility 3 docs; Plaso/log2timeline; Eric Zimmerman's tools; SANS DFIR posters;81NIST SP 800-86.8283---84_Portions adapted from [reverse-skill](https://github.com/zhaoxuya520/reverse-skill) by zhaoxuya520, MIT License._