Web Idor

Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)

When it applies

The app trusts a client-supplied identifier to decide which object to return or mutate, and authorization is checked at the route ("is logged in?") but not at the object ("does THIS user own THIS object?").

Why it works

Access control is missing at the data layer. The server maps id → row and returns it without asking whether the current session is allowed that row. Sequential/predictable ids make enumeration trivial; even UUIDs leak (in listings, referrers, other endpoints).

Method

1. Get two accounts (A = attacker, B = victim). Do an action as B, capture the request, note the object id.
2. Replay as A: swap in B's id (or A's session + B's id). Returned/changed = IDOR.
3. Cover all verbs & spots: id in path, query, body, JSON, cookie, and X-* headers; test GET/POST/PUT/DELETE — read-only checks often miss write IDOR.
4. Automate the two-session diff with Burp Autorize/AutoRepeater: it re-sends every request with A's cookies and flags responses that shouldn't succeed.
5. Enumerate where ids are sequential to size impact (count of exposed records), without hoarding real PII.

Gotchas

• "UUID so it's safe" is false — UUIDs appear in other responses, emails, and referers.
• Sometimes the id is hashed/encoded (base64, md5(id)) — decode, tamper, re-encode.
• Mass-assignment overlaps: changing an owner_id/user_id in the body can grant access.
• Blind write-IDOR: no response body, but the victim object changed — verify from B's view.

Verify success

You read or modify an object belonging to another tenant/user using your own session. Screenshot both: your session token + the victim's data/changed state.

References

PortSwigger access-control labs; OWASP API Security Top 10 (BOLA).