How do I install the Web Open Redirect skill?

Run npx skillmds@latest add noorqureshi/web-open-redirect in your terminal (requires Node.js), paste this page's agent-chat prompt into Claude, Cursor, or any MCP-connected agent, or download the SKILL.md file and copy it into your agent's skills directory.

Is Web Open Redirect safe to use?

This skill has not completed SkillMD's automated safety review yet. SkillMD never runs a skill's scripts for you; review the SKILL.md before installing.

Which AI agents work with Web Open Redirect?

This skill is tagged as working with Claude Code, Claude.ai, OpenAI Codex. SKILL.md is an open format, so most agents that read a skills directory can load it too.

Is Web Open Redirect free to use?

Yes. Installing skills from SkillMD is free, and the skill stays under its author's original license.

Who published Web Open Redirect?

NoorQureshi (@noorqureshi) published this skill. Their other Agent Skills are listed on their SkillMD profile.

Web Open Redirect by noorqureshi — Agent Skill

Name: Web Open Redirect
Author: NoorQureshi

Web Open Redirect

Open redirect — abuse a redirect param to send users to attacker sites, and chain it (OAuth token theft, SSRF filter bypass, phishing). Load on params like redirect=, next=, url=, return=, callback=, dest=, or a 30x Location built from input. Signals: `?returnUrl=`, login redirects, OAuth `redirect_uri`.

NoorQureshi 48491ba 2.0 KB Updated Sep 17, 2026

File contents

Open redirect

When it applies

The app redirects to a location derived from user input without validating it stays on-site. Low severity alone — but a powerful chain link.

Why it works

The redirect target is attacker-controlled and trusted. On its own it's phishing; chained, it turns other flows malicious (OAuth codes/tokens sent to your host, SSRF allowlist bypass via a redirect to an internal URL).

Method

Find the param (redirect/next/url/return/dest/callback) and set it to an external URL; follow the response — a 30x Location: https://evil.com (or JS/meta redirect) confirms.
Bypass naive validation: //evil.com, https:evil.com, https://target.com@evil.com, https://target.com.evil.com, /\evil.com, whitelisted-prefix tricks, double-encoding, CRLF.
Chain for impact:
- OAuth: if it's the redirect_uri/return in an auth flow → steal the code/token (→ web-oauth, ATO).
- SSRF allowlist: allowed host that open-redirects to an internal target bypasses the filter.
- XSS: javascript: scheme in the redirect where the sink allows it.

Gotchas

Standalone open redirect is often low/informational — lead with the chain (OAuth/SSRF) for real severity.
Test both server 30x and client-side (JS location, meta refresh) redirects.
Path-relative allowlists frequently miss // and \ — try them.

Verify success

The app redirects the user to an attacker-controlled origin, or (chained) a token/code is delivered to your host / an SSRF filter is bypassed.

References

PortSwigger OAuth+redirect labs; OWASP Unvalidated Redirects Cheat Sheet.

---name: web-open-redirectdescription: Open redirect — abuse a redirect param to send users to attacker sites, and chain it (OAuth token theft, SSRF filter bypass, phishing). Load on params like redirect=, next=, url=, return=, callback=, dest=, or a 30x Location built from input. Signals: `?returnUrl=`, login redirects, OAuth `redirect_uri`.---# Open redirect## When it appliesThe app redirects to a location derived from user input without validating it stays on-site.Low severity alone — but a powerful chain link.## Why it worksThe redirect target is attacker-controlled and trusted. On its own it's phishing; chained, itturns other flows malicious (OAuth codes/tokens sent to your host, SSRF allowlist bypass via aredirect to an internal URL).## Method1. **Find the param** (`redirect/next/url/return/dest/callback`) and set it to an external URL; follow the response — a 30x `Location: https://evil.com` (or JS/meta redirect) confirms.2. **Bypass naive validation**: `//evil.com`, `https:evil.com`, `https://target.com@evil.com`, `https://target.com.evil.com`, `/\evil.com`, whitelisted-prefix tricks, double-encoding, CRLF.3. **Chain for impact**: - **OAuth**: if it's the `redirect_uri`/return in an auth flow → steal the code/token (→ `web-oauth`, ATO). - **SSRF allowlist**: allowed host that open-redirects to an internal target bypasses the filter. - **XSS**: `javascript:` scheme in the redirect where the sink allows it.## Gotchas- Standalone open redirect is often low/informational — lead with the chain (OAuth/SSRF) for real severity.- Test both server 30x and client-side (JS `location`, meta refresh) redirects.- Path-relative allowlists frequently miss `//` and `\` — try them.## Verify successThe app redirects the user to an attacker-controlled origin, or (chained) a token/code isdelivered to your host / an SSRF filter is bypassed.## ReferencesPortSwigger OAuth+redirect labs; OWASP Unvalidated Redirects Cheat Sheet.

Frequently asked questions