Thick client security testing
When it applies
The engagement includes a desktop application — a client-server (C/S) client built on
Electron, Qt, .NET WinForms/WPF, or native code — rather than a pure web app. Typical triggers:
an installer in scope, credentials cached locally, an auto-updater, a loopback port or named
pipe, or API calls the UI never exposes. Record the installer source and the test accounts in
scope.txt (tradecraft-scope-roe); test only machines and accounts you're authorized for.
Why it works
A thick client is a server-side trust boundary shipped to an attacker-controlled machine:
everything it stores, every check it enforces locally, and every API it knows how to call is
yours to read. The client cannot keep secrets from its operator — so hardcoded keys, hidden
admin endpoints, and client-enforced validation are structural findings, not luck.
Method
Work boundary → local surface → network surface → reverse-engineering confirmation.
- Map the trust boundary. Enumerate the process tree and child processes, any services or
drivers it installs, listening ports (a loopback socket bound to
0.0.0.0 is an instant
finding), outbound domains, and the sensitive paths it touches: %APPDATA%, Keychain,
registry hives. Process Monitor and TCPView (Sysinternals) get you this in minutes.
- Work the local attack surface. Look for plaintext config and logs, hardcoded keys,
leftover debug switches and hidden menus, SQLite databases (permissions and encryption),
credential storage (DPAPI / Keychain / plaintext), autostart entries, install/uninstall
residue and file permissions, and on Windows DLL search-order hijacking. Check IPC: who can
connect to the named pipe / loopback port, and is there any authentication?
- Work the network surface. Determine whether the app honors the system proxy or uses
custom TLS; force it through Burp/mitmproxy. Certificate pinning → the usual bypasses
(
mobile-cert-pinning-bypass techniques, or Frida on the desktop process). Once traffic is
visible, hunt client-hidden API surface: admin functions the UI gates but the server may
not — feed the recovered endpoints into api-testing-checklist / api-bola.
- Reverse to confirm. .NET → dnSpy/ILSpy (deobfuscate with de4dot if needed). Native →
reverse-eng-binary-triage. Electron → extract app.asar (npx asar extract app.asar out/)
and treat it as front-end JS (reverse-eng-js). Verify how licenses, signatures, and
integrity checks are enforced — anything checked only client-side is bypassable by design.
- Update channel & supply chain. Check the update URL (HTTP vs HTTPS), whether the update
package is signature-verified, and whether the check itself runs client-side. A confirmed
weak update channel is high-impact — document, don't weaponize, without explicit scope.
Gotchas
- Electron apps are web apps in a trench coat — don't start with a disassembler; the
asar plus DevTools answers most questions in minutes.
- .NET obfuscation makes dnSpy output noisy — run de4dot first, and prefer runtime
inspection (dnSpy debugger) over static reading for the interesting checks.
- "Server validates too" assumption — never report client-side-only checks without testing
the server's response to a tampered request; some are genuinely enforced server-side.
- Clean up your artifacts — remove planted DLLs, proxy certificates, patched binaries, and
test accounts when done (house rule: minimize footprint).
Verify success
You have a trust-boundary diagram (processes, ports, files, servers), both local and network
surfaces covered, and at least one concrete, demonstrated finding class — e.g. a recovered
secret, a server-accepted tampered request, or an unauthenticated IPC connection — validated
per reporting-triage-validation.
References
OWASP Desktop Application Security Top 10; Sysinternals suite; dnSpy docs; reverse-eng-js,
reverse-eng-binary-triage, mobile-cert-pinning-bypass in this library.
Portions adapted from reverse-skill by zhaoxuya520, MIT License.
1---2name: reverse-eng-thick-client3description: >4 Security-test a desktop thick client end to end: map its trust boundaries, then work the5 local attack surface (config files, credential storage, IPC, update channel) and the network6 surface (proxying, certificate pinning, hidden APIs). Load for a C/S desktop app in scope —7 Electron, Qt, .NET WinForms/WPF, or native — an installer to audit, local config/credential8 storage to assess, named pipes or loopback IPC, an auto-update channel, or a client that9 hides admin-only API calls.10domain: reverse-engineering11type: methodology12stability: learning13modes: [pentest, bugbounty]14severity: high15cwe: [CWE-798, CWE-312, CWE-426, CWE-319]16tools: [procmon, sysinternals, burp, mitmproxy, dnspy, ghidra, asar, frida]17schema_version: 118metadata:19 source: https://skillmd.com/skills/noorqureshi/reverse-eng-thick-client20---2122# Thick client security testing2324## When it applies25The engagement includes a desktop application — a client-server (C/S) client built on26Electron, Qt, .NET WinForms/WPF, or native code — rather than a pure web app. Typical triggers:27an installer in scope, credentials cached locally, an auto-updater, a loopback port or named28pipe, or API calls the UI never exposes. Record the installer source and the test accounts in29`scope.txt` (`tradecraft-scope-roe`); test only machines and accounts you're authorized for.3031## Why it works32A thick client is a server-side trust boundary shipped to an attacker-controlled machine:33everything it stores, every check it enforces locally, and every API it knows how to call is34yours to read. The client cannot keep secrets from its operator — so hardcoded keys, hidden35admin endpoints, and client-enforced validation are structural findings, not luck.3637## Method38Work boundary → local surface → network surface → reverse-engineering confirmation.39401. **Map the trust boundary.** Enumerate the process tree and child processes, any services or41 drivers it installs, listening ports (a loopback socket bound to `0.0.0.0` is an instant42 finding), outbound domains, and the sensitive paths it touches: `%APPDATA%`, Keychain,43 registry hives. Process Monitor and TCPView (Sysinternals) get you this in minutes.442. **Work the local attack surface.** Look for plaintext config and logs, hardcoded keys,45 leftover debug switches and hidden menus, SQLite databases (permissions and encryption),46 credential storage (DPAPI / Keychain / plaintext), autostart entries, install/uninstall47 residue and file permissions, and on Windows DLL search-order hijacking. Check IPC: who can48 connect to the named pipe / loopback port, and is there any authentication?493. **Work the network surface.** Determine whether the app honors the system proxy or uses50 custom TLS; force it through Burp/mitmproxy. Certificate pinning → the usual bypasses51 (`mobile-cert-pinning-bypass` techniques, or Frida on the desktop process). Once traffic is52 visible, hunt client-hidden API surface: admin functions the UI gates but the server may53 not — feed the recovered endpoints into `api-testing-checklist` / `api-bola`.544. **Reverse to confirm.** .NET → dnSpy/ILSpy (deobfuscate with de4dot if needed). Native →55 `reverse-eng-binary-triage`. Electron → extract `app.asar` (`npx asar extract app.asar out/`)56 and treat it as front-end JS (`reverse-eng-js`). Verify how licenses, signatures, and57 integrity checks are enforced — anything checked only client-side is bypassable by design.585. **Update channel & supply chain.** Check the update URL (HTTP vs HTTPS), whether the update59 package is signature-verified, and whether the check itself runs client-side. A confirmed60 weak update channel is high-impact — document, don't weaponize, without explicit scope.6162## Gotchas63- **Electron apps are web apps in a trench coat** — don't start with a disassembler; the64 `asar` plus DevTools answers most questions in minutes.65- **.NET obfuscation** makes dnSpy output noisy — run de4dot first, and prefer runtime66 inspection (dnSpy debugger) over static reading for the interesting checks.67- **"Server validates too" assumption** — never report client-side-only checks without testing68 the server's response to a tampered request; some are genuinely enforced server-side.69- **Clean up your artifacts** — remove planted DLLs, proxy certificates, patched binaries, and70 test accounts when done (house rule: minimize footprint).7172## Verify success73You have a trust-boundary diagram (processes, ports, files, servers), both local and network74surfaces covered, and at least one concrete, demonstrated finding class — e.g. a recovered75secret, a server-accepted tampered request, or an unauthenticated IPC connection — validated76per `reporting-triage-validation`.7778## References79OWASP Desktop Application Security Top 10; Sysinternals suite; dnSpy docs; `reverse-eng-js`,80`reverse-eng-binary-triage`, `mobile-cert-pinning-bypass` in this library.8182---83_Portions adapted from [reverse-skill](https://github.com/zhaoxuya520/reverse-skill) by zhaoxuya520, MIT License._