Browser extension reverse engineering
When it applies
The target is a browser extension — a .crx/.xpi package or an unpacked extension directory —
not ordinary page JavaScript (for that, load reverse-eng-js). Typical jobs: audit an in-scope
extension's client-side signing/encryption/proxy logic, hunt for over-privileged permissions in a
review, or investigate a malicious or supply-chain-poisoned extension. Target must be confirmed in
scope.txt (tradecraft-scope-roe); for malicious samples work in an isolated VM and see
defense-malware-triage.
Why it works
An extension is just a zip with a manifest.json that declares its entire trust surface —
permissions, host permissions, entry scripts. Reading the manifest first tells you exactly which
scripts can touch which origins, and every browser-API capability (webRequest, cookies,
nativeMessaging) is reachable by grepping for chrome.* / browser.* calls from those entry
points. The dynamic half is free: Chrome runs unpacked extensions natively and DevTools attaches
straight to the background service worker.
Method
- Unpack.
.xpi is a plain zip. .crx has a CRX3 header before the zip data — most unzip
tools tolerate it; if not, strip the header or pull the already-unpacked copy from the browser
profile (.../Extensions/<id>/<version>/).
- Read the manifest first:
jq '{permissions, host_permissions, background, content_scripts, web_accessible_resources, externally_connectable, content_security_policy}' manifest.json.
Record MV2 (background.scripts, webRequestBlocking) vs MV3 (background.service_worker,
declarativeNetRequest) — it changes where the logic lives.
- Score the permission surface. Red flags:
<all_urls> (read/write any site),
webRequest/webRequestBlocking (MITM-grade request rewriting), debugger, cookies,
nativeMessaging (escapes the browser to a host binary — follow it with
reverse-eng-binary-triage), and externally_connectable (lets web pages drive the
extension — a remote attack surface).
- Trace the logic. Start at the service worker / background entry, then the content scripts —
note each script's
matches, run_at, and whether it runs in the isolated world. Grep for
chrome.storage / IndexedDB to find stored keys and tokens, and for
runtime.onMessage/sendMessage/postMessage to map who can drive what. For obfuscated or
webpack-packed code, anchor on the chrome.* API calls and run the reverse-eng-js recovery
flow; for the fast attack-side path see web-client-side-signing-bypass.
- Go dynamic. Load the unpacked directory at
chrome://extensions (Developer mode), watch
for load errors, then open DevTools on the service worker link. Trigger events and observe
network traffic and message passing; Burp/CDP covers the deeper hooks. For known-bad hunting,
run YARA rules for malicious-extension families over the unpacked tree.
Gotchas
- MV3 service workers suspend when idle — breakpoints go cold. Keep the worker's DevTools
window open and trigger the event you're tracing; don't expect it to be alive on its own.
- MV3
declarativeNetRequest is declarative — the blocking/redirect logic lives in the JSON
ruleset, not JS. Read the rules file; there is no function to hook.
- Content scripts run in an isolated world — page JS can't see their variables, and they can't
see the page's. Cross-talk happens over the DOM or
postMessage; audit both directions.
- Secrets live in the installed profile, not the package —
chrome.storage.local persists in
the profile's LevelDB; check there during a live-host review.
.crx from the Web Store is signed and version-locked — for reproducible analysis record the
extension ID + version, and diff updates before concluding.
Verify success
You can state, with evidence: the full permission surface and entry scripts, the data flow (what
the extension reads, where it sends it, where keys/tokens live), and who can message it
(other extensions, web pages, native hosts) — each claim cited to a manifest field or code location.
References
Chrome MV3 migration docs; chrome://extensions developer mode; OWASP CISQ extension guidance.
Portions adapted from reverse-skill by zhaoxuya520, MIT License.
1---2name: web-extension-reverse3description: >4 Reverse engineer browser extensions (Chrome/Edge MV2/MV3, Firefox) for an authorized review:5 unpack .crx/.xpi, assess the permission surface, trace background/service-worker and content-script6 logic, and recover credential, signing, or traffic-handling behavior. Load on "analyze this7 extension", extension supply-chain or malicious-extension investigation, or keys hidden in8 chrome.storage. Signals: .crx, .xpi, manifest.json, chrome-extension://, <all_urls>,9 webRequestBlocking, declarativeNetRequest, externally_connectable, nativeMessaging.10domain: web11type: technique12stability: learning13modes: [pentest, bugbounty, defense]14severity: medium15mitre: [T1176]16cwe: [CWE-798]17tools: [jq, chrome-devtools, yara, unzip]18schema_version: 119metadata:20 source: https://skillmd.com/skills/noorqureshi/web-extension-reverse21---2223# Browser extension reverse engineering2425## When it applies26The target is a browser extension — a `.crx`/`.xpi` package or an unpacked extension directory —27not ordinary page JavaScript (for that, load `reverse-eng-js`). Typical jobs: audit an in-scope28extension's client-side signing/encryption/proxy logic, hunt for over-privileged permissions in a29review, or investigate a malicious or supply-chain-poisoned extension. Target must be confirmed in30`scope.txt` (`tradecraft-scope-roe`); for malicious samples work in an isolated VM and see31`defense-malware-triage`.3233## Why it works34An extension is just a zip with a `manifest.json` that declares its entire trust surface —35permissions, host permissions, entry scripts. Reading the manifest first tells you exactly which36scripts can touch which origins, and every browser-API capability (`webRequest`, `cookies`,37`nativeMessaging`) is reachable by grepping for `chrome.*` / `browser.*` calls from those entry38points. The dynamic half is free: Chrome runs unpacked extensions natively and DevTools attaches39straight to the background service worker.4041## Method421. **Unpack.** `.xpi` is a plain zip. `.crx` has a CRX3 header before the zip data — most unzip43 tools tolerate it; if not, strip the header or pull the already-unpacked copy from the browser44 profile (`.../Extensions/<id>/<version>/`).452. **Read the manifest first:** `jq '{permissions, host_permissions, background, content_scripts,46 web_accessible_resources, externally_connectable, content_security_policy}' manifest.json`.47 Record MV2 (`background.scripts`, `webRequestBlocking`) vs MV3 (`background.service_worker`,48 `declarativeNetRequest`) — it changes where the logic lives.493. **Score the permission surface.** Red flags: `<all_urls>` (read/write any site),50 `webRequest`/`webRequestBlocking` (MITM-grade request rewriting), `debugger`, `cookies`,51 `nativeMessaging` (escapes the browser to a host binary — follow it with52 `reverse-eng-binary-triage`), and `externally_connectable` (lets *web pages* drive the53 extension — a remote attack surface).544. **Trace the logic.** Start at the service worker / background entry, then the content scripts —55 note each script's `matches`, `run_at`, and whether it runs in the isolated world. Grep for56 `chrome.storage` / IndexedDB to find stored keys and tokens, and for57 `runtime.onMessage`/`sendMessage`/`postMessage` to map who can drive what. For obfuscated or58 webpack-packed code, anchor on the `chrome.*` API calls and run the `reverse-eng-js` recovery59 flow; for the fast attack-side path see `web-client-side-signing-bypass`.605. **Go dynamic.** Load the unpacked directory at `chrome://extensions` (Developer mode), watch61 for load errors, then open DevTools on the **service worker** link. Trigger events and observe62 network traffic and message passing; Burp/CDP covers the deeper hooks. For known-bad hunting,63 run YARA rules for malicious-extension families over the unpacked tree.6465## Gotchas66- **MV3 service workers suspend when idle** — breakpoints go cold. Keep the worker's DevTools67 window open and trigger the event you're tracing; don't expect it to be alive on its own.68- **MV3 `declarativeNetRequest` is declarative** — the blocking/redirect logic lives in the JSON69 ruleset, not JS. Read the rules file; there is no function to hook.70- **Content scripts run in an isolated world** — page JS can't see their variables, and they can't71 see the page's. Cross-talk happens over the DOM or `postMessage`; audit both directions.72- **Secrets live in the installed profile, not the package** — `chrome.storage.local` persists in73 the profile's LevelDB; check there during a live-host review.74- **`.crx` from the Web Store is signed and version-locked** — for reproducible analysis record the75 extension ID + version, and diff updates before concluding.7677## Verify success78You can state, with evidence: the full permission surface and entry scripts, the data flow (what79the extension reads, where it sends it, where keys/tokens live), and who can message it80(other extensions, web pages, native hosts) — each claim cited to a manifest field or code location.8182## References83Chrome MV3 migration docs; `chrome://extensions` developer mode; OWASP CISQ extension guidance.8485---86_Portions adapted from [reverse-skill](https://github.com/zhaoxuya520/reverse-skill) by zhaoxuya520, MIT License._