How do I install the Cloud Docker Registry skill?

Run npx skillmds@latest add noorqureshi/cloud-docker-registry in your terminal (requires Node.js), paste this page's agent-chat prompt into Claude, Cursor, or any MCP-connected agent, or download the SKILL.md file and copy it into your agent's skills directory.

Is Cloud Docker Registry safe to use?

This skill has not completed SkillMD's automated safety review yet. SkillMD never runs a skill's scripts for you; review the SKILL.md before installing.

Which AI agents work with Cloud Docker Registry?

This skill is tagged as working with Claude Code, Claude.ai, OpenAI Codex. SKILL.md is an open format, so most agents that read a skills directory can load it too.

Is Cloud Docker Registry free to use?

Yes. Installing skills from SkillMD is free, and the skill stays under its author's original license.

Who published Cloud Docker Registry?

NoorQureshi (@noorqureshi) published this skill. Their other Agent Skills are listed on their SkillMD profile.

Cloud Docker Registry by noorqureshi

Name: Cloud Docker Registry
Author: NoorQureshi

Cloud Docker Registry

Find and loot exposed container registries — image pull/push, secrets baked in layers, and registry misconfig. Load on exposed Docker registry (port 5000, /v2/), a registry URL, harbor/ECR/ GCR/ACR references, or "container registry". Signals: /v2/_catalog, registry:2, unauth pull/push.

NoorQureshi 24c6ccc 2.2 KB Updated Sep 17, 2026

File contents

Exposed container registry

When it applies

A Docker/OCI registry is reachable — a self-hosted registry (:5000, /v2/), or a cloud one (ECR/GCR/ACR/Harbor) with weak auth. Images are goldmines: source, configs, and baked-in secrets.

Why it works

Registries are often deployed without auth ("internal only") or with over-broad pull access. Image layers preserve everything added at build time — .env files, cloud keys, private source, tokens — even if a later layer deletes them, earlier layers keep them.

Method

Detect & enumerate: curl -s https://registry:5000/v2/_catalog (repo list) and .../v2/<repo>/tags/list. registry:2 banner / an unauth /v2/ = exposed.
Pull images: docker pull registry:5000/<repo>:<tag> or crane pull (no docker daemon). Anonymous pull of private images is the finding.
Mine layers for secrets: crane export/docker save then scan with trufflehog filesystem / grep for keys, .env, kubeconfig, cloud creds (→ validate with code-review-secrets-detection).
Push (critical): if anonymous/weak push works, you can poison images (supply-chain) — prove with a harmless tag, don't tamper real images.
Cloud registries: test misconfigured ECR/GCR/ACR policies; leaked registry creds → pull private images.

Gotchas

Scan all layers/history, not just the final image — secrets hide in intermediate layers.
Anonymous push is critical (supply-chain); anonymous pull of private images is high — rate accordingly.
Only pull what proves the issue; images can be large and contain real data — handle carefully.

Verify success

Anonymous/unauthorized pull of a private image, a live secret extracted from its layers, or a successful (harmless) push proving write access.

References

Docker registry API docs; crane/trufflehog; "hacking Docker registries" write-ups.

---name: cloud-docker-registrydescription: Find and loot exposed container registries — image pull/push, secrets baked in layers, and registry misconfig. Load on exposed Docker registry (port 5000, /v2/), a registry URL, harbor/ECR/ GCR/ACR references, or "container registry". Signals: /v2/_catalog, registry:2, unauth pull/push.---# Exposed container registry## When it appliesA Docker/OCI registry is reachable — a self-hosted registry (`:5000`, `/v2/`), or a cloud one(ECR/GCR/ACR/Harbor) with weak auth. Images are goldmines: source, configs, and baked-in secrets.## Why it worksRegistries are often deployed without auth ("internal only") or with over-broad pull access. Imagelayers preserve everything added at build time — `.env` files, cloud keys, private source,tokens — even if a later layer deletes them, earlier layers keep them.## Method1. **Detect & enumerate**: `curl -s https://registry:5000/v2/_catalog` (repo list) and `.../v2/<repo>/tags/list`. `registry:2` banner / an unauth `/v2/` = exposed.2. **Pull images**: `docker pull registry:5000/<repo>:<tag>` or `crane pull` (no docker daemon). Anonymous pull of private images is the finding.3. **Mine layers for secrets**: `crane export`/`docker save` then scan with `trufflehog filesystem` / grep for keys, `.env`, kubeconfig, cloud creds (→ validate with `code-review-secrets-detection`).4. **Push (critical)**: if anonymous/weak push works, you can poison images (supply-chain) — prove with a harmless tag, don't tamper real images.5. **Cloud registries**: test misconfigured ECR/GCR/ACR policies; leaked registry creds → pull private images.## Gotchas- Scan *all* layers/history, not just the final image — secrets hide in intermediate layers.- Anonymous **push** is critical (supply-chain); anonymous **pull** of private images is high — rate accordingly.- Only pull what proves the issue; images can be large and contain real data — handle carefully.## Verify successAnonymous/unauthorized pull of a private image, a live secret extracted from its layers, or asuccessful (harmless) push proving write access.## ReferencesDocker registry API docs; crane/trufflehog; "hacking Docker registries" write-ups.

Frequently asked questions