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Run npx skillmds@latest add noorqureshi/code-review-cicd in your terminal (requires Node.js), paste this page's agent-chat prompt into Claude, Cursor, or any MCP-connected agent, or download the SKILL.md file and copy it into your agent's skills directory.

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This skill is tagged as working with Claude Code, Claude.ai, OpenAI Codex. SKILL.md is an open format, so most agents that read a skills directory can load it too.

Is Code Review Cicd free to use?

Yes. Installing skills from SkillMD is free, and the skill stays under its author's original license.

Who published Code Review Cicd?

NoorQureshi (@noorqureshi) published this skill. Their other Agent Skills are listed on their SkillMD profile.

Code Review Cicd by noorqureshi — Agent Skill

Name: Code Review Cicd
Author: NoorQureshi

Code Review Cicd

Review CI/CD pipelines for security flaws — poisoned workflows, secret leakage, and injection. Load on GitHub Actions / GitLab CI / Jenkins config, ".github/workflows", pull_request_target, self-hosted runners, or "pipeline security". Signals: workflow YAML, secrets in CI, third-party actions.

NoorQureshi 7f99470 2.3 KB Updated Sep 17, 2026

File contents

CI/CD pipeline security review

When it applies

You can read a repo's CI config (GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, Jenkinsfile, CircleCI). Pipelines run with secrets and often on attacker-influenced input (PRs), making them a high-value, under-reviewed target.

Why it works

CI runs code with privileged tokens/secrets. Misconfigurations let a fork PR run in a trusted context, inject commands via untrusted inputs, or exfiltrate secrets — a supply-chain foothold. On public repos this can be exploitable by anyone who opens a PR.

Method

Dangerous triggers: pull_request_target / workflow_run that check out and run PR code with secrets in scope → fork PRs can steal secrets or run arbitrary code (the classic GitHub Actions bug).
Script injection: untrusted data (github.event.issue.title, PR body, branch name) used directly in run: shells → command injection. Look for ${{ github.event.* }} in run blocks.
Secret handling: secrets echoed/logged, passed to third-party actions, or available to fork PRs; overly broad permissions: (default write), long-lived GITHUB_TOKEN.
Untrusted dependencies: third-party actions pinned to a mutable tag/branch (not a SHA), curl-pipe-to-shell steps, unpinned package installs → supply-chain.
Self-hosted runners on public repos: fork PRs executing on your infra → RCE on the runner.

Gotchas

pull_request (safe-ish) vs pull_request_target (dangerous) — the trigger name is the crux.
An action pinned to @v3 (tag) can be moved; require a full commit SHA for third-party actions.
Secret leakage often happens via a step passing ${{ secrets.X }} to an untrusted action.

Verify success

A concrete path where an outsider (fork PR / issue) can execute code with pipeline privileges or exfiltrate a secret, or a clear secret-leak/injection in the workflow.

References

GitHub Actions security hardening docs; "GitHub Actions pwn requests" (Nathan Davison); semgrep CI rules.

---name: code-review-cicddescription: Review CI/CD pipelines for security flaws — poisoned workflows, secret leakage, and injection. Load on GitHub Actions / GitLab CI / Jenkins config, ".github/workflows", pull_request_target, self-hosted runners, or "pipeline security". Signals: workflow YAML, secrets in CI, third-party actions.---# CI/CD pipeline security review## When it appliesYou can read a repo's CI config (GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, Jenkinsfile, CircleCI). Pipelines runwith secrets and often on attacker-influenced input (PRs), making them a high-value, under-reviewed target.## Why it worksCI runs code with privileged tokens/secrets. Misconfigurations let a fork PR run in a trustedcontext, inject commands via untrusted inputs, or exfiltrate secrets — a supply-chain foothold. Onpublic repos this can be exploitable by anyone who opens a PR.## Method1. **Dangerous triggers**: `pull_request_target` / `workflow_run` that check out and run **PR code** with secrets in scope → fork PRs can steal secrets or run arbitrary code (the classic GitHub Actions bug).2. **Script injection**: untrusted data (`github.event.issue.title`, PR body, branch name) used directly in `run:` shells → command injection. Look for `${{ github.event.* }}` in `run` blocks.3. **Secret handling**: secrets echoed/logged, passed to third-party actions, or available to fork PRs; overly broad `permissions:` (default `write`), long-lived `GITHUB_TOKEN`.4. **Untrusted dependencies**: third-party actions pinned to a mutable tag/branch (not a SHA), curl-pipe-to-shell steps, unpinned package installs → supply-chain.5. **Self-hosted runners** on public repos: fork PRs executing on your infra → RCE on the runner.## Gotchas- `pull_request` (safe-ish) vs `pull_request_target` (dangerous) — the trigger name is the crux.- An action pinned to `@v3` (tag) can be moved; require a full commit SHA for third-party actions.- Secret leakage often happens via a step passing `${{ secrets.X }}` to an untrusted action.## Verify successA concrete path where an outsider (fork PR / issue) can execute code with pipeline privileges orexfiltrate a secret, or a clear secret-leak/injection in the workflow.## ReferencesGitHub Actions security hardening docs; "GitHub Actions pwn requests" (Nathan Davison); semgrep CI rules.

Frequently asked questions