Network Password Spraying

Password spraying & credential stuffing

When it applies

You have (or can build) a list of valid usernames and a reachable authentication surface, and the engagement authorizes credential attacks. Spraying beats brute force whenever a lockout policy exists — you try one password against every user, not many passwords against one.

Mode gate: this is pentest-only. Nearly every bug-bounty program prohibits brute force, credential stuffing, and anything that risks account lockout or DoS — do not spray on a bounty target. Confirm the lockout policy and testing window in roe.md/scope.txt first (tradecraft-scope-roe).

Why it works

Organizations enforce complexity but not unpredictability: in any large user set, some accounts use Season+Year!, Company@123, or a breach-reused password. Spraying one guess per user per lockout window stays under the counter, so you get many attempts' worth of coverage without tripping lockouts.

Method

1. Build the user list. Enumerate/validate names first (OSINT, recon-*, Kerbrute against a DC, O365 user-enum). Verify the username format (first.last, flast, UPN) before spraying.
2. Learn the lockout policy. Read it from AD (net accounts, nxc smb <dc> --pass-pol) or ask. Stay to one attempt per user per window, and leave a margin (e.g. 4 tries if the threshold is 5). Track attempt timestamps so you never double-tap a user in a window.
3. Pick seasonal/contextual candidates, not a wordlist: Month+Year!, Season+Year!, <CompanyName>1!, Welcome1, Password1. One or two per window, spaced across windows.
4. Spray the surface with a tool that throttles and tracks:
   • AD/SMB/LDAP: nxc smb <dc> -u users.txt -p 'Season2026!' --continue-on-success
   • Kerberos (pre-auth, quieter, no SMB logon events): kerbrute passwordspray -d <domain> users.txt 'Season2026!'
   • O365/Entra: a purpose-built sprayer that handles throttling and MFA responses.
5. On a hit, stop and pivot — validate the cred, check where it's valid (SMB/WinRM/VPN/OWA), and move to ad-* / privesc-* rather than continuing to spray.

Gotchas

• Lockout is the cardinal risk — miscounting windows or a retry loop can lock out a whole department. Rate is a hard limit, not a suggestion; when unsure, slow down.
• Smart lockout / conditional access (Entra) can look like a wrong password while silently flagging you — watch for changed response timing/codes, not just "failed".
• MFA: a valid password against an MFA-gated portal is still a real finding (and may expose MFA-fatigue or legacy-protocol bypass) — record it; don't try to defeat MFA unless authorized.
• Credential stuffing (breach-list creds) only against accounts/domains in scope; never load third-party breach data about people outside the engagement.

Verify success

A username+password pair authenticates against an in-scope service, confirmed with a benign action (e.g. nxc reports [+], an OWA login, or a VPN session) — with no accounts locked out.

References

MITRE ATT&CK T1110.003/.004; NetExec (nxc) and Kerbrute docs; NIST SP 800-63B on credential policy.