Social-engineering engagement methodology
When this governs
Load this first, before any phishing/vishing/pretext/physical skill. Social engineering targets
people, so it carries authorization and duty-of-care requirements beyond a normal technical test.
This is pentest-only: it is never run against a bug-bounty target, and never against individuals
or organizations that have not authorized it in writing.
Authorization — stricter than technical scope
On top of tradecraft-scope-roe, an SE engagement requires, in writing, before anything:
- Explicit sign-off from someone empowered to consent for the employees being tested (not just
IT) — SE tests real staff, so leadership/HR/legal must have approved the human-factor testing.
- The pretext boundaries: which themes are allowed and which are off-limits (no fake layoffs,
bonuses, medical/family emergencies, or anything that causes real distress or coerces protected
decisions).
- Target boundaries: which people/roles/sites are in scope; who is explicitly excluded.
- A "no-harm" line: no real financial transactions, no exfiltration of real personal data, no
actions that damage systems, and no impersonation of real named individuals without consent.
- A get-out-of-jail letter carried during any physical work, plus a live emergency contact who
can confirm authorization to anyone who challenges the tester.
If any of that is missing or unclear, stop and get it — do not "just send a test phish".
The lifecycle
- Objective — what the client wants to learn (click rate, credential submission, report rate,
physical access, callback rate). It's a measurement, not a "gotcha".
- Recon — only OSINT needed for a credible pretext (
recon-osint), scoped to in-scope targets.
- Pretext design — believable, within the allowed themes, proportionate to the objective.
- Execute with tracking — instrument so every step is measured and attributable to the test
(unique tokens/links), and so results can't be confused with a real attack.
- Measure & clean up — collect metrics, disable pretext infra, and delete any personal data
captured beyond what the metric needs.
- Report for awareness — outcomes and root causes, framed to improve defenses and training,
never to name-and-shame individuals.
Guardrails (always)
- Minimize harm and data. Prove the human-factor risk with the least intrusion; capture the
metric, not people's real secrets. A credential-harvest page records "a credential was submitted",
it does not store or reuse real passwords.
- Stay attributable and reversible. Every artifact is tagged as the assessment; nothing is left
running; a challenged tester can prove authorization immediately.
- Protect the humans. No lasting distress, no targeting of individuals' personal/home life, no
themes the client excluded. If a target escalates emotionally, de-escalate and disclose.
- Report defensively. Findings drive controls (MFA, reporting culture, physical procedures) and
training — individuals are aggregated, not singled out.
Verify
Written authorization (incl. consent for testing staff), agreed pretext/target boundaries, a
no-harm line, and a tracking + cleanup plan all exist before execution; the deliverable is an
awareness-oriented report with metrics and remediation.
References
MITRE ATT&CK T1566 (Phishing), T1598 (Phishing for Information); disclose.io-style safe-harbor
framing; standard pentest SE rules of engagement.
1---2name: social-eng-methodology3description: Plan and run an AUTHORIZED social-engineering assessment safely — the load-first guardrails for any human-factor test. Load before any phishing, vishing, pretext, or physical work. Signals: "social engineering", "phishing assessment", "test our employees", "security awareness", a human-factor objective in a pentest SoW. Establishes authorization, safety, tracking, and the awareness-focused report.4---56# Social-engineering engagement methodology78## When this governs9Load this **first**, before any phishing/vishing/pretext/physical skill. Social engineering targets10*people*, so it carries authorization and duty-of-care requirements beyond a normal technical test.11This is `pentest`-only: it is never run against a bug-bounty target, and never against individuals12or organizations that have not authorized it in writing.1314## Authorization — stricter than technical scope15On top of `tradecraft-scope-roe`, an SE engagement requires, in writing, before anything:16- **Explicit sign-off from someone empowered to consent for the employees being tested** (not just17 IT) — SE tests real staff, so leadership/HR/legal must have approved the human-factor testing.18- **The pretext boundaries**: which themes are allowed and which are off-limits (no fake layoffs,19 bonuses, medical/family emergencies, or anything that causes real distress or coerces protected20 decisions).21- **Target boundaries**: which people/roles/sites are in scope; who is explicitly excluded.22- **A "no-harm" line**: no real financial transactions, no exfiltration of real personal data, no23 actions that damage systems, and no impersonation of real named individuals without consent.24- **A get-out-of-jail letter** carried during any physical work, plus a live emergency contact who25 can confirm authorization to anyone who challenges the tester.2627If any of that is missing or unclear, **stop and get it** — do not "just send a test phish".2829## The lifecycle301. **Objective** — what the client wants to learn (click rate, credential submission, report rate,31 physical access, callback rate). It's a measurement, not a "gotcha".322. **Recon** — only OSINT needed for a credible pretext (`recon-osint`), scoped to in-scope targets.333. **Pretext design** — believable, within the allowed themes, proportionate to the objective.344. **Execute with tracking** — instrument so every step is measured and attributable to the test35 (unique tokens/links), and so results can't be confused with a real attack.365. **Measure & clean up** — collect metrics, disable pretext infra, and delete any personal data37 captured beyond what the metric needs.386. **Report for awareness** — outcomes and root causes, framed to improve defenses and training,39 never to name-and-shame individuals.4041## Guardrails (always)42- **Minimize harm and data.** Prove the human-factor risk with the least intrusion; capture the43 metric, not people's real secrets. A credential-harvest page records "a credential was submitted",44 it does not store or reuse real passwords.45- **Stay attributable and reversible.** Every artifact is tagged as the assessment; nothing is left46 running; a challenged tester can prove authorization immediately.47- **Protect the humans.** No lasting distress, no targeting of individuals' personal/home life, no48 themes the client excluded. If a target escalates emotionally, de-escalate and disclose.49- **Report defensively.** Findings drive controls (MFA, reporting culture, physical procedures) and50 training — individuals are aggregated, not singled out.5152## Verify53Written authorization (incl. consent for testing staff), agreed pretext/target boundaries, a54no-harm line, and a tracking + cleanup plan all exist before execution; the deliverable is an55awareness-oriented report with metrics and remediation.5657## References58MITRE ATT&CK T1566 (Phishing), T1598 (Phishing for Information); disclose.io-style safe-harbor59framing; standard pentest SE rules of engagement.