Phishing assessment
When it applies
The engagement authorizes an email human-factor test and you've cleared social-eng-methodology
(authorization, allowed pretext themes, target boundaries, no-harm line). The goal is a
measurement — click rate, credential-submission rate, and, most importantly, the report rate
— not to embarrass anyone.
Why it works
Phishing exploits trust and context, not a software bug: a message that looks like it comes from a
trusted source, with a plausible reason to act now, gets clicks even from trained users. Measuring
that safely tells the client where awareness and technical controls (MFA, mail filtering, reporting
tooling) need to improve.
Method
- Pick the objective and metric. Awareness baseline (did they click?), credential resilience
(did they submit?), or reporting culture (did they report it, and how fast?). The metric shapes
the whole campaign.
- Scope the target list to authorized recipients only; segment (department/role) so results
are actionable. Never add anyone outside the agreed boundaries.
- Design a proportionate pretext within the allowed themes (e.g. an internal IT/HR notice, a
shared-document notification). Keep it believable but avoid excluded/harmful themes and real
named individuals.
- Stand up tracked infrastructure. A dedicated sender domain and a landing page, every
recipient carrying a unique token so clicks/submissions are attributable to the test. Use a
framework built for this (e.g. GoPhish) so tracking and teardown are clean.
- Land safely. The page measures the action and then discloses it's an authorized
assessment with a short awareness message. A credential form records "a credential was submitted"
for the metric — it does not store, display, or reuse the real password.
- Deliver and measure over the agreed window; capture click/submit/report rates and time-to-
report per segment.
- Tear down and clean up. Disable the infra, purge any captured data beyond the metric, and
confirm nothing is left reachable.
Gotchas
- Never keep real credentials. Record the event, not the secret; a test that stockpiles staff
passwords has itself become the risk.
- Report rate is the win metric — a high report rate is a healthy result; frame it that way,
don't optimize purely for clicks.
- Coordinate with the blue team/help desk per RoE so a real incident response isn't triggered
(or, if testing detection, so it's an intended part of the exercise).
- Aggregate results. The report improves controls and training; it does not name and shame
individuals.
- Excluded themes stay excluded — no fake emergencies, layoffs, or bonuses; proportionality is
a hard limit from
social-eng-methodology.
Verify success
A clean metric set (click / submission / report rates, time-to-report) attributable to the test,
with all pretext infrastructure torn down and no real personal data retained — feeding an
awareness-focused writeup (reporting-pentest-report).
References
MITRE ATT&CK T1566.001/.002, T1598.003; GoPhish documentation; awareness-program metrics guidance.
1---2name: social-eng-phishing3description: Run an authorized phishing / spear-phishing assessment that measures human-factor risk — pretext, delivery, landing page, and tracking — without harming staff or hoarding real data. Load after social-eng-methodology when the objective is email-based (click, credential submission, or report rate). Signals: "phishing test", "simulated phishing", "test click rate", "credential harvesting assessment", awareness-campaign objective.4---56# Phishing assessment78## When it applies9The engagement authorizes an email human-factor test and you've cleared `social-eng-methodology`10(authorization, allowed pretext themes, target boundaries, no-harm line). The goal is a11*measurement* — click rate, credential-submission rate, and, most importantly, the **report rate**12— not to embarrass anyone.1314## Why it works15Phishing exploits trust and context, not a software bug: a message that looks like it comes from a16trusted source, with a plausible reason to act now, gets clicks even from trained users. Measuring17that safely tells the client where awareness and technical controls (MFA, mail filtering, reporting18tooling) need to improve.1920## Method211. **Pick the objective and metric.** Awareness baseline (did they click?), credential resilience22 (did they submit?), or reporting culture (did they report it, and how fast?). The metric shapes23 the whole campaign.242. **Scope the target list** to authorized recipients only; segment (department/role) so results25 are actionable. Never add anyone outside the agreed boundaries.263. **Design a proportionate pretext** within the allowed themes (e.g. an internal IT/HR notice, a27 shared-document notification). Keep it believable but avoid excluded/harmful themes and real28 named individuals.294. **Stand up tracked infrastructure.** A dedicated sender domain and a landing page, every30 recipient carrying a unique token so clicks/submissions are attributable to the test. Use a31 framework built for this (e.g. GoPhish) so tracking and teardown are clean.325. **Land safely.** The page measures the action and then **discloses** it's an authorized33 assessment with a short awareness message. A credential form records "a credential was submitted"34 for the metric — it does not store, display, or reuse the real password.356. **Deliver and measure** over the agreed window; capture click/submit/report rates and time-to-36 report per segment.377. **Tear down and clean up.** Disable the infra, purge any captured data beyond the metric, and38 confirm nothing is left reachable.3940## Gotchas41- **Never keep real credentials.** Record the event, not the secret; a test that stockpiles staff42 passwords has itself become the risk.43- **Report rate is the win metric** — a high report rate is a healthy result; frame it that way,44 don't optimize purely for clicks.45- **Coordinate with the blue team/help desk** per RoE so a real incident response isn't triggered46 (or, if testing detection, so it's an intended part of the exercise).47- **Aggregate results.** The report improves controls and training; it does not name and shame48 individuals.49- **Excluded themes stay excluded** — no fake emergencies, layoffs, or bonuses; proportionality is50 a hard limit from `social-eng-methodology`.5152## Verify success53A clean metric set (click / submission / report rates, time-to-report) attributable to the test,54with all pretext infrastructure torn down and no real personal data retained — feeding an55awareness-focused writeup (`reporting-pentest-report`).5657## References58MITRE ATT&CK T1566.001/.002, T1598.003; GoPhish documentation; awareness-program metrics guidance.