Web Python Sandbox Escape

Python sandbox / eval escape

When it applies

User input reaches eval(), exec(), a "safe expression" evaluator, a template engine that runs Python, or a feature that runs user formulas — and a blocklist tries to make it safe by banning words like import, os, or system. If you can evaluate Python at all, the blocklist is almost always bypassable.

Why it works

String-based keyword filters remove names, but the objects they'd name are still reachable through Python's object graph. From any object you can walk __class__ → __base__ → __subclasses__() to find a class whose module gives you code execution (subprocess.Popen, os.system, builtins), without ever typing a banned identifier literally.

Method

1. Confirm evaluation. Send an arithmetic probe (7*7 → 49) or a type leak (().__class__) to prove Python is evaluating your input.
2. Reach the class tree. From a literal you're allowed: ().__class__.__base__.__subclasses__() — enumerate to find a useful class (look for subprocess.Popen, os._wrap_close, warnings.catch_warnings → builtins). Index into the list once you know the position.
3. Execute via the found class, e.g. (index varies per build): ().__class__.__base__.__subclasses__()[N]('id',shell=True,stdout=-1).communicate().
4. Defeat banned identifiers without typing them:
   • Attribute by string: getattr(obj,'sys'+'tem').
   • Build names from chars: "__imp"+"ort__", chr(...), or index into strings.
   • Reach builtins: ().__class__.__base__.__subclasses__()[i].__init__.__globals__['__builtins__'].
5. Alternate sinks — if the input is YAML/pickle rather than eval: unsafe yaml.load and pickle.loads execute __reduce__; str.format/f-string on attacker templates can read object internals ({0.__class__}) → info leak → escalate.

Gotchas

• __subclasses__() ordering is not stable across Python versions/builds — enumerate at runtime to find your target's index, don't hardcode it.
• Blocklist vs allowlist — a true AST allowlist (only permitted nodes) is far harder; test whether attribute access / subscripting is even parsed before going deep.
• eval with restricted __builtins__ still leaks via the class tree — that's the whole point.
• This overlaps web-ssti (Jinja uses the same gadget) — if it's a template, start there.

Verify success

Command output from the host (e.g. id, a file read) returned through the evaluator, proving code execution past the sandbox — not just a leaked class name.

References

"Python jail escape" / pyjail write-ups; PayloadsAllTheThings (Python sandbox); CWE-94/95.