Collecting Indicators of Compromise
When to Use
- During active incident response to identify and block adversary infrastructure
- Post-incident to document all observed adversary artifacts for future detection
- When sharing threat intelligence with ISACs, sector partners, or law enforcement
- When building detection rules in SIEM, EDR, or network security tools
- When enriching IOCs with threat intelligence context for risk scoring
Do not use for behavioral TTP analysis without accompanying technical indicators; use MITRE ATT&CK mapping for behavioral characterization.
Prerequisites
- Access to incident evidence sources: SIEM logs, EDR telemetry, memory dumps, disk images, network captures
- Threat intelligence platform (MISP, OpenCTI, ThreatConnect) for IOC management and sharing
- IOC enrichment tools: VirusTotal, OTX (AlienVault Open Threat Exchange), Shodan, DomainTools
- STIX 2.1 knowledge for structured IOC representation
- Sharing agreements with relevant ISACs (FS-ISAC, H-ISAC, IT-ISAC) or sector partners
Workflow
Step 1: Identify IOC Categories
Collect indicators across all categories from incident evidence:
Network Indicators:
- IP addresses (C2 servers, staging servers, exfiltration destinations)
- Domain names (C2 domains, phishing domains, DGA domains)
- URLs (malware download, C2 check-in, exfiltration endpoints)
- JA3/JA3S hashes (TLS client/server fingerprints)
- User-Agent strings (custom or unusual HTTP headers)
- DNS query patterns (tunneling signatures, DGA patterns)
Host Indicators:
- File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256 of malware, tools, scripts)
- File paths (known malware installation directories)
- Registry keys (persistence mechanisms, configuration storage)
- Scheduled tasks and service names (persistence)
- Mutex/event names (malware instance synchronization)
- Named pipes (C2 communication channels, e.g., Cobalt Strike)
Email Indicators:
- Sender addresses and domains (spoofed or attacker-controlled)
- Subject lines and body content patterns
- Attachment names and hashes
- Embedded URLs
- Email header anomalies (SPF/DKIM/DMARC failures)
Step 2: Extract IOCs from Evidence Sources
Systematically extract indicators from each evidence source:
From SIEM/Log Analysis:
# Extract unique destination IPs from firewall logs
index=firewall action=blocked
| stats count by dest_ip
| where count > 100
# Extract domains from DNS query logs
index=dns query=*evil* OR query=*c2*
| stats count by query
From Memory Forensics:
# Extract network connections
vol -f memory.raw windows.netscan | grep ESTABLISHED
# Extract strings from suspicious process memory
vol -f memory.raw windows.memmap --pid 3847 --dump
strings -n 8 pid.3847.dmp | grep -E "(http|https)://"
From Malware Analysis:
Sandbox Report IOC Extraction:
- Dropped files: 3 (hashes extracted)
- DNS queries: update.evil[.]com, cdn.malware[.]net
- HTTP connections: POST to https://185.220.101[.]42/gate.php
- Registry modified: HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\svcupdate
- Mutex created: Global\MTX_0x1234ABCD
- Named pipe: \\.\pipe\MSSE-1234-server
Step 3: Enrich IOCs with Context
Add threat intelligence context to each indicator:
IOC Enrichment Report:
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
IP: 185.220.101.42
VirusTotal: 12/89 vendors flag as malicious
Shodan: Open ports: 443, 8443, 80
Geolocation: Netherlands, AS208476
First Seen: 2025-10-01
Threat Intel: Associated with Qakbot C2 infrastructure
Confidence: High
TLP: AMBER
Domain: update.evil[.]com
Registration: 2025-10-28 (recently registered)
Registrar: Namecheap
WHOIS Privacy: Yes
VirusTotal: 8/89 vendors flag as malicious
DNS History: Resolved to 185.220.101.42, 91.215.85.17
Confidence: High
TLP: AMBER
Step 4: Score and Prioritize IOCs
Assign confidence and risk scores to each indicator:
| Score |
Confidence Level |
Criteria |
| 90-100 |
Confirmed Malicious |
Multiple TI sources confirm, observed in active attack |
| 70-89 |
Highly Suspicious |
Single TI source confirms, behavioral analysis supports |
| 50-69 |
Suspicious |
Limited TI data, contextually suspicious |
| 30-49 |
Unconfirmed |
No TI matches, but anomalous in environment |
| 0-29 |
Likely Benign |
False positive indicators or legitimate infrastructure |
Step 5: Distribute IOCs for Detection and Blocking
Push IOCs to defensive systems for immediate protection:
- Firewall/IPS: Block C2 IPs and domains
- DNS: Sinkhole malicious domains
- EDR: Add file hashes to blocklist, create custom IOC watchlists
- Email Gateway: Block sender domains, attachment hashes, malicious URLs
- SIEM: Create correlation searches for IOC matches
- Web Proxy: Block URLs and domains in web filtering policy
Step 6: Share IOCs with Partners
Package IOCs in STIX 2.1 format for sharing:
{
"type": "indicator",
"spec_version": "2.1",
"id": "indicator--a1b2c3d4-e5f6-7890-abcd-ef1234567890",
"created": "2025-11-15T18:00:00Z",
"modified": "2025-11-15T18:00:00Z",
"name": "Qakbot C2 Server IP",
"indicator_types": ["malicious-activity"],
"pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '185.220.101.42']",
"pattern_type": "stix",
"valid_from": "2025-11-15T14:23:00Z",
"confidence": 95,
"labels": ["c2", "qakbot"],
"object_marking_refs": ["marking-definition--f88d31f6-486f-44da-b317-01333bde0b82"]
}
Submit to MISP, ISAC portals, and TAXII servers per sharing agreements.
Key Concepts
| Term |
Definition |
| IOC (Indicator of Compromise) |
Technical artifact observed during a security incident that indicates adversary presence (hash, IP, domain, etc.) |
| TLP (Traffic Light Protocol) |
Standard for classifying the sharing restrictions of threat intelligence: WHITE, GREEN, AMBER, AMBER+STRICT, RED |
| STIX (Structured Threat Information Expression) |
Standard language for representing cyber threat intelligence in a structured, machine-readable format |
| TAXII (Trusted Automated Exchange of Intelligence Information) |
Transport protocol for sharing STIX-formatted threat intelligence between organizations |
| Confidence Score |
Numerical rating (0-100) indicating the analyst's certainty that an indicator is truly malicious |
| IOC Lifecycle |
Process of creating, validating, distributing, and eventually retiring indicators as they lose relevance |
| Defanging |
Practice of modifying malicious URLs and domains in reports to prevent accidental clicks (e.g., evil[.]com) |
Tools & Systems
- MISP: Open-source threat intelligence sharing platform for managing, storing, and distributing IOCs
- VirusTotal: Multi-engine malware scanning and threat intelligence platform for IOC enrichment
- OpenCTI: Open-source cyber threat intelligence platform supporting STIX 2.1 natively
- Yeti: Open-source platform for organizing observables, indicators, and TTPs
- CyberChef: GCHQ's data transformation tool useful for decoding, defanging, and formatting IOCs
Common Scenarios
Scenario: Post-Incident IOC Package for ISAC Sharing
Context: After responding to a Qakbot infection that led to Cobalt Strike deployment, the IR team must package all IOCs for sharing with the Financial Services ISAC (FS-ISAC).
Approach:
- Compile all network, host, and email indicators from the investigation
- Enrich each IOC with VirusTotal and MISP correlation data
- Assign confidence scores based on direct observation vs. secondary correlation
- Mark all IOCs with TLP:AMBER for partner sharing
- Export as STIX 2.1 bundle and submit to FS-ISAC TAXII feed
- Create a human-readable IOC summary report for email distribution
Pitfalls:
- Including internal IP addresses or hostnames in shared IOC packages (information leakage)
- Sharing IOCs at TLP:WHITE that should be restricted to TLP:AMBER
- Not defanging URLs and domains in human-readable reports
- Sharing IP addresses of legitimate CDNs or cloud providers as malicious IOCs
Output Format
INDICATOR OF COMPROMISE REPORT
================================
Incident: INC-2025-1547
Date: 2025-11-15
TLP: AMBER
Sharing: FS-ISAC, internal SOC
NETWORK INDICATORS
Type | Value | Confidence | Context
---------|--------------------------|------------|--------
IPv4 | 185.220.101[.]42 | 95 | Qakbot C2 server
IPv4 | 91.215.85[.]17 | 90 | Cobalt Strike C2
Domain | update.evil[.]com | 95 | Staging domain
URL | hxxps://185.220[.]101.42/gate.php | 95 | C2 check-in
JA3 | a0e9f5d64349fb13191bc7...| 80 | Qakbot TLS fingerprint
HOST INDICATORS
Type | Value | Confidence | Context
---------|--------------------------|------------|--------
SHA-256 | a1b2c3d4e5f6... | 100 | Qakbot dropper
SHA-256 | b2c3d4e5f6a7... | 100 | Cobalt Strike beacon
FilePath | C:\Users\*\AppData\Local\Temp\update.exe | 85 | Dropper location
RegKey | HKCU\...\Run\svcupdate | 90 | Persistence
Mutex | Global\MTX_0x1234ABCD | 95 | Qakbot instance lock
Task | WindowsUpdate | 90 | Scheduled task persistence
EMAIL INDICATORS
Type | Value | Confidence | Context
---------|--------------------------|------------|--------
Sender | billing@spoofed[.]com | 95 | Phishing sender
Subject | "Invoice-Nov2025" | 70 | Phishing subject line
Hash | c3d4e5f6a7b8... | 100 | Malicious .docm attachment
TOTAL: 14 indicators | HIGH confidence avg: 91
Source: mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills → skills/collecting-indicators-of-compromise/SKILL.md
1---2name: collecting-indicators-of-compromise3description: 'Systematically collects, categorizes, and distributes indicators of compromise (IOCs) during and after security incidents to enable detection, blocking, and threat intelligence sharing. Covers network, host, email, and behavioral indicators using STIX/TAXII formats and threat intelligence platforms. Activates for requests involving IOC collection, indicator extraction, threat indicator sharing, compromise indicators, STIX export, or IOC enrichment. '4---5
6
7# Collecting Indicators of Compromise
8
9## When to Use
10
11- During active incident response to identify and block adversary infrastructure
12- Post-incident to document all observed adversary artifacts for future detection
13- When sharing threat intelligence with ISACs, sector partners, or law enforcement
14- When building detection rules in SIEM, EDR, or network security tools
15- When enriching IOCs with threat intelligence context for risk scoring
16
17**Do not use** for behavioral TTP analysis without accompanying technical indicators; use MITRE ATT&CK mapping for behavioral characterization.
18
19## Prerequisites
20
21- Access to incident evidence sources: SIEM logs, EDR telemetry, memory dumps, disk images, network captures
22- Threat intelligence platform (MISP, OpenCTI, ThreatConnect) for IOC management and sharing
23- IOC enrichment tools: VirusTotal, OTX (AlienVault Open Threat Exchange), Shodan, DomainTools
24- STIX 2.1 knowledge for structured IOC representation
25- Sharing agreements with relevant ISACs (FS-ISAC, H-ISAC, IT-ISAC) or sector partners
26
27## Workflow
28
29### Step 1: Identify IOC Categories
30
31Collect indicators across all categories from incident evidence:
32
33**Network Indicators:**
34- IP addresses (C2 servers, staging servers, exfiltration destinations)
35- Domain names (C2 domains, phishing domains, DGA domains)
36- URLs (malware download, C2 check-in, exfiltration endpoints)
37- JA3/JA3S hashes (TLS client/server fingerprints)
38- User-Agent strings (custom or unusual HTTP headers)
39- DNS query patterns (tunneling signatures, DGA patterns)
40
41**Host Indicators:**
42- File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256 of malware, tools, scripts)
43- File paths (known malware installation directories)
44- Registry keys (persistence mechanisms, configuration storage)
45- Scheduled tasks and service names (persistence)
46- Mutex/event names (malware instance synchronization)
47- Named pipes (C2 communication channels, e.g., Cobalt Strike)
48
49**Email Indicators:**
50- Sender addresses and domains (spoofed or attacker-controlled)
51- Subject lines and body content patterns
52- Attachment names and hashes
53- Embedded URLs
54- Email header anomalies (SPF/DKIM/DMARC failures)
55
56### Step 2: Extract IOCs from Evidence Sources
57
58Systematically extract indicators from each evidence source:
59
60**From SIEM/Log Analysis:**
61```
62# Extract unique destination IPs from firewall logs
63index=firewall action=blocked
64| stats count by dest_ip
65| where count > 100
66
67# Extract domains from DNS query logs
68index=dns query=*evil* OR query=*c2*
69| stats count by query
70```
71
72**From Memory Forensics:**
73```bash
74# Extract network connections
75vol -f memory.raw windows.netscan | grep ESTABLISHED
76
77# Extract strings from suspicious process memory
78vol -f memory.raw windows.memmap --pid 3847 --dump
79strings -n 8 pid.3847.dmp | grep -E "(http|https)://"
80```
81
82**From Malware Analysis:**
83```
84Sandbox Report IOC Extraction:
85- Dropped files: 3 (hashes extracted)
86- DNS queries: update.evil[.]com, cdn.malware[.]net
87- HTTP connections: POST to https://185.220.101[.]42/gate.php
88- Registry modified: HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\svcupdate
89- Mutex created: Global\MTX_0x1234ABCD
90- Named pipe: \\.\pipe\MSSE-1234-server
91```
92
93### Step 3: Enrich IOCs with Context
94
95Add threat intelligence context to each indicator:
96
97```
98IOC Enrichment Report:
99━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
100IP: 185.220.101.42
101 VirusTotal: 12/89 vendors flag as malicious
102 Shodan: Open ports: 443, 8443, 80
103 Geolocation: Netherlands, AS208476
104 First Seen: 2025-10-01
105 Threat Intel: Associated with Qakbot C2 infrastructure
106 Confidence: High
107 TLP: AMBER
108
109Domain: update.evil[.]com
110 Registration: 2025-10-28 (recently registered)
111 Registrar: Namecheap
112 WHOIS Privacy: Yes
113 VirusTotal: 8/89 vendors flag as malicious
114 DNS History: Resolved to 185.220.101.42, 91.215.85.17
115 Confidence: High
116 TLP: AMBER
117```
118
119### Step 4: Score and Prioritize IOCs
120
121Assign confidence and risk scores to each indicator:
122
123| Score | Confidence Level | Criteria |
124|-------|-----------------|----------|
125| 90-100 | Confirmed Malicious | Multiple TI sources confirm, observed in active attack |
126| 70-89 | Highly Suspicious | Single TI source confirms, behavioral analysis supports |
127| 50-69 | Suspicious | Limited TI data, contextually suspicious |
128| 30-49 | Unconfirmed | No TI matches, but anomalous in environment |
129| 0-29 | Likely Benign | False positive indicators or legitimate infrastructure |
130
131### Step 5: Distribute IOCs for Detection and Blocking
132
133Push IOCs to defensive systems for immediate protection:
134
135- **Firewall/IPS**: Block C2 IPs and domains
136- **DNS**: Sinkhole malicious domains
137- **EDR**: Add file hashes to blocklist, create custom IOC watchlists
138- **Email Gateway**: Block sender domains, attachment hashes, malicious URLs
139- **SIEM**: Create correlation searches for IOC matches
140- **Web Proxy**: Block URLs and domains in web filtering policy
141
142### Step 6: Share IOCs with Partners
143
144Package IOCs in STIX 2.1 format for sharing:
145
146```json
147{
148 "type": "indicator",
149 "spec_version": "2.1",
150 "id": "indicator--a1b2c3d4-e5f6-7890-abcd-ef1234567890",
151 "created": "2025-11-15T18:00:00Z",
152 "modified": "2025-11-15T18:00:00Z",
153 "name": "Qakbot C2 Server IP",
154 "indicator_types": ["malicious-activity"],
155 "pattern": "[ipv4-addr:value = '185.220.101.42']",
156 "pattern_type": "stix",
157 "valid_from": "2025-11-15T14:23:00Z",
158 "confidence": 95,
159 "labels": ["c2", "qakbot"],
160 "object_marking_refs": ["marking-definition--f88d31f6-486f-44da-b317-01333bde0b82"]
161}
162```
163
164Submit to MISP, ISAC portals, and TAXII servers per sharing agreements.
165
166## Key Concepts
167
168| Term | Definition |
169|------|------------|
170| **IOC (Indicator of Compromise)** | Technical artifact observed during a security incident that indicates adversary presence (hash, IP, domain, etc.) |
171| **TLP (Traffic Light Protocol)** | Standard for classifying the sharing restrictions of threat intelligence: WHITE, GREEN, AMBER, AMBER+STRICT, RED |
172| **STIX (Structured Threat Information Expression)** | Standard language for representing cyber threat intelligence in a structured, machine-readable format |
173| **TAXII (Trusted Automated Exchange of Intelligence Information)** | Transport protocol for sharing STIX-formatted threat intelligence between organizations |
174| **Confidence Score** | Numerical rating (0-100) indicating the analyst's certainty that an indicator is truly malicious |
175| **IOC Lifecycle** | Process of creating, validating, distributing, and eventually retiring indicators as they lose relevance |
176| **Defanging** | Practice of modifying malicious URLs and domains in reports to prevent accidental clicks (e.g., evil[.]com) |
177
178## Tools & Systems
179
180- **MISP**: Open-source threat intelligence sharing platform for managing, storing, and distributing IOCs
181- **VirusTotal**: Multi-engine malware scanning and threat intelligence platform for IOC enrichment
182- **OpenCTI**: Open-source cyber threat intelligence platform supporting STIX 2.1 natively
183- **Yeti**: Open-source platform for organizing observables, indicators, and TTPs
184- **CyberChef**: GCHQ's data transformation tool useful for decoding, defanging, and formatting IOCs
185
186## Common Scenarios
187
188### Scenario: Post-Incident IOC Package for ISAC Sharing
189
190**Context**: After responding to a Qakbot infection that led to Cobalt Strike deployment, the IR team must package all IOCs for sharing with the Financial Services ISAC (FS-ISAC).
191
192**Approach**:
1931. Compile all network, host, and email indicators from the investigation
1942. Enrich each IOC with VirusTotal and MISP correlation data
1953. Assign confidence scores based on direct observation vs. secondary correlation
1964. Mark all IOCs with TLP:AMBER for partner sharing
1975. Export as STIX 2.1 bundle and submit to FS-ISAC TAXII feed
1986. Create a human-readable IOC summary report for email distribution
199
200**Pitfalls**:
201- Including internal IP addresses or hostnames in shared IOC packages (information leakage)
202- Sharing IOCs at TLP:WHITE that should be restricted to TLP:AMBER
203- Not defanging URLs and domains in human-readable reports
204- Sharing IP addresses of legitimate CDNs or cloud providers as malicious IOCs
205
206## Output Format
207
208```
209INDICATOR OF COMPROMISE REPORT
210================================
211Incident: INC-2025-1547
212Date: 2025-11-15
213TLP: AMBER
214Sharing: FS-ISAC, internal SOC
215
216NETWORK INDICATORS
217Type | Value | Confidence | Context
218---------|--------------------------|------------|--------
219IPv4 | 185.220.101[.]42 | 95 | Qakbot C2 server
220IPv4 | 91.215.85[.]17 | 90 | Cobalt Strike C2
221Domain | update.evil[.]com | 95 | Staging domain
222URL | hxxps://185.220[.]101.42/gate.php | 95 | C2 check-in
223JA3 | a0e9f5d64349fb13191bc7...| 80 | Qakbot TLS fingerprint
224
225HOST INDICATORS
226Type | Value | Confidence | Context
227---------|--------------------------|------------|--------
228SHA-256 | a1b2c3d4e5f6... | 100 | Qakbot dropper
229SHA-256 | b2c3d4e5f6a7... | 100 | Cobalt Strike beacon
230FilePath | C:\Users\*\AppData\Local\Temp\update.exe | 85 | Dropper location
231RegKey | HKCU\...\Run\svcupdate | 90 | Persistence
232Mutex | Global\MTX_0x1234ABCD | 95 | Qakbot instance lock
233Task | WindowsUpdate | 90 | Scheduled task persistence
234
235EMAIL INDICATORS
236Type | Value | Confidence | Context
237---------|--------------------------|------------|--------
238Sender | billing@spoofed[.]com | 95 | Phishing sender
239Subject | "Invoice-Nov2025" | 70 | Phishing subject line
240Hash | c3d4e5f6a7b8... | 100 | Malicious .docm attachment
241
242TOTAL: 14 indicators | HIGH confidence avg: 91
243```
244
245---
246
247**Source:** [`mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills`](https://github.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills) → `skills/collecting-indicators-of-compromise/SKILL.md`