thedixitjain Conducting Phishing Incident Response
When to Use
- A user reports receiving a suspicious email via the phishing report button or abuse mailbox
- Email gateway detects a malicious email that bypassed initial filtering
- Threat intelligence indicates an active phishing campaign targeting the organization
- A user confirms they clicked a link or opened an attachment from a suspicious email
- Credentials have been entered on a suspected phishing page
Do not use for business email compromise (BEC) involving compromised internal accounts; use BEC response procedures which focus on account takeover investigation.
Prerequisites
- Email security gateway with message trace and quarantine capabilities (Microsoft Defender for Office 365, Proofpoint, Mimecast)
- Microsoft 365 admin access or Google Workspace admin for mailbox search and purge
- Malware sandbox for attachment and URL analysis (ANY.RUN, Joe Sandbox, Hybrid Analysis)
- Email header analysis tools (MXToolbox Header Analyzer, Google Admin Toolbox)
- Identity provider access for account remediation (Azure AD, Okta, Duo)
- Phishing report intake process (dedicated mailbox or integrated report button)
Workflow
Step 1: Receive and Triage the Phishing Report
Evaluate the reported email to determine if it is malicious:
- Extract the email as an .EML or .MSG file (preserves headers)
- Analyze email headers to determine the true sender, relay path, and authentication results
Email Header Analysis Checklist:
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Return-Path: billing@spoofed-domain[.]com
From: "IT Support" <support@corp-lookalike[.]com>
Reply-To: attacker@gmail[.]com (different from From)
SPF: FAIL (sender IP not authorized for domain)
DKIM: FAIL (signature invalid)
DMARC: FAIL (policy: none - no enforcement)
Received: from mail.attacker-infra[.]net [45.33.x.x]
X-Originating-IP: 45.33.x.x
Message-ID: <random@attacker-infra.net>
Classification criteria:
- Confirmed Phishing: Malicious URL/attachment, spoofed sender, credential harvesting page
- Suspicious: Anomalous headers but no confirmed malicious content
- Spam/Marketing: Unwanted but not malicious
- Legitimate: Not a phishing email (false report)
Step 2: Analyze Malicious Content
Examine URLs and attachments in a safe environment:
URL Analysis:
- Check URL against VirusTotal, URLscan.io, and Google Safe Browsing
- Open URL in a sandbox browser to capture the landing page
- Check if the URL redirects to a credential harvesting page
- Identify the phishing kit type (Microsoft 365 login clone, Okta clone, generic)
- Determine if the phishing page is still active
Attachment Analysis:
- Calculate file hash (SHA-256) and check against VirusTotal
- Detonate in sandbox (ANY.RUN, Joe Sandbox)
- Analyze document for macros (olevba for Office files)
- Check for embedded exploits (CVE exploitation in document parsers)
Step 3: Determine Scope of Impact
Identify all recipients and assess who interacted with the phishing email:
Scope Assessment:
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Total Recipients: 47 users
Delivered to Inbox: 38 users (9 caught by email gateway)
Opened Email: 24 users (email tracking pixel data)
Clicked Link: 8 users (proxy/firewall logs)
Entered Credentials: 3 users (phishing page submitted form data)
Opened Attachment: 2 users (EDR process execution telemetry)
Search methods:
- Microsoft 365: Use Threat Explorer or Content Search to find all instances of the email
- Google Workspace: Use Admin Console > Investigation tool for message search
- Proxy logs: Search for connections to the phishing URL from internal IPs
- EDR: Search for attachment file hash execution across all endpoints
Step 4: Contain the Threat
Execute containment actions based on impact assessment:
Email Containment:
- Purge the phishing email from all mailboxes using Microsoft 365 Content Search and Purge or Google Workspace Admin delete
- Block the sender domain at the email gateway
- Add the phishing URL to the web proxy blocklist
- Add attachment hash to email gateway and EDR blocklists
Account Containment (for users who entered credentials):
- Force password reset immediately
- Revoke all active sessions and OAuth tokens
- Enable or re-verify MFA enrollment
- Review mailbox rules for attacker-created forwarding rules
- Check for unauthorized OAuth application grants
- Review recent sign-in activity for suspicious locations
# Microsoft 365: Revoke sessions and reset password
Connect-AzureAD
Revoke-AzureADUserAllRefreshToken -ObjectId "user@corp.com"
Set-AzureADUserPassword -ObjectId "user@corp.com" -ForceChangePasswordNextLogin $true
# Check for mailbox forwarding rules
Get-InboxRule -Mailbox "user@corp.com" | Where-Object {$_.ForwardTo -or $_.RedirectTo}
# Remove suspicious forwarding rules
Remove-InboxRule -Mailbox "user@corp.com" -Identity "Rule Name"
Step 5: Eradicate and Recover
Remove all traces of the phishing attack:
- Confirm email purge completed successfully across all mailboxes
- Verify compromised accounts have been secured (password changed, sessions revoked, MFA verified)
- Remove any malware installed via phishing attachments from affected endpoints
- Monitor compromised accounts for 72 hours for signs of continued unauthorized access
- Check for data exfiltration from compromised accounts during the exposure window
Step 6: Post-Incident Actions
Strengthen defenses against similar phishing attacks:
- Report the phishing URL to Google Safe Browsing and Microsoft SmartScreen
- Submit the phishing domain for takedown via the domain registrar abuse contact
- Update email gateway filtering rules based on observed evasion techniques
- Send targeted security awareness notification to affected users
- Update phishing simulation program to include the observed technique
Key Concepts
| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| Spear Phishing | Targeted phishing attack crafted for a specific individual or organization using personalized content |
| Credential Harvesting | Phishing technique that mimics a legitimate login page to capture usernames and passwords |
| SPF (Sender Policy Framework) | Email authentication protocol that specifies which mail servers are authorized to send email for a domain |
| DKIM (DomainKeys Identified Mail) | Email authentication method using cryptographic signatures to verify that an email was not altered in transit |
| DMARC | Policy framework that uses SPF and DKIM to determine email authenticity and instructs receivers on handling failures |
| OAuth Consent Phishing | Attack that tricks users into granting malicious OAuth applications access to their email and data |
| Email Header | Metadata embedded in every email containing routing, authentication, and sender information used for forensic analysis |
Tools & Systems
- Microsoft Defender for Office 365: Email threat protection with Threat Explorer for investigation and automated purge
- Proofpoint TAP (Targeted Attack Protection): Email security platform with URL rewriting and attachment sandboxing
- URLscan.io: Online service that scans URLs and captures screenshots of phishing pages for evidence
- PhishTool: Phishing analysis platform that automates header analysis, URL inspection, and IOC extraction
- GoPhish: Open-source phishing simulation platform for security awareness testing
Common Scenarios
Scenario: Microsoft 365 Credential Phishing via QR Code
Context: Users report an email claiming to be from IT requiring MFA re-enrollment. The email contains a QR code that links to a convincing Microsoft 365 login page clone hosted on a compromised WordPress site.
Approach:
- Scan the QR code in a sandbox to extract the URL
- Analyze the phishing page: captures credentials and MFA tokens (adversary-in-the-middle attack)
- Search email gateway for all recipients using message subject and sender as search criteria
- Cross-reference with proxy logs to identify users who visited the phishing URL
- Force password reset and revoke sessions for all users who visited the URL
- Purge the email from all mailboxes and block the sender domain
- Notify users about the specific campaign with visual examples of the phishing email
Pitfalls:
- Not checking for adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) capability that captures session tokens even with MFA
- Only resetting passwords without revoking active sessions (attacker retains access via stolen session cookies)
- Not searching for mailbox forwarding rules created by the attacker after compromising an account
- Missing QR code phishing (quishing) because URL scanning tools cannot decode QR code images
Output Format
PHISHING INCIDENT RESPONSE REPORT
===================================
Incident: INC-2025-1602
Date Reported: 2025-11-16T09:15:00Z
Reported By: jdoe@corp.example.com
Classification: Credential Phishing (AiTM)
EMAIL ANALYSIS
Subject: "Action Required: MFA Re-enrollment"
Sender: it-support@corp-security[.]com (spoofed)
SPF: FAIL | DKIM: FAIL | DMARC: FAIL
Phishing URL: hxxps://compromised-site[.]com/ms365/login
Phishing Type: Microsoft 365 AiTM credential harvester
IMPACT ASSESSMENT
Recipients: 47
Clicked Link: 8
Credentials Entered: 3 (confirmed via proxy POST data)
CONTAINMENT ACTIONS
[x] Email purged from all 47 mailboxes
[x] Phishing domain blocked at web proxy
[x] Sender domain blocked at email gateway
[x] 3 compromised accounts: passwords reset, sessions revoked
[x] Mailbox forwarding rules reviewed (1 malicious rule removed)
[x] OAuth app grants reviewed (no unauthorized grants found)
IOCs EXTRACTED
Domain: corp-security[.]com
URL: hxxps://compromised-site[.]com/ms365/login
IP: 104.21.x.x (Cloudflare-hosted)
Sender: it-support@corp-security[.]com
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Implement DMARC enforcement (p=reject) for corp domain
2. Deploy QR code scanning in email gateway
3. Send targeted awareness notification to all 47 recipients
4. Request domain takedown via registrar abuse contact
Source: mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills → skills/conducting-phishing-incident-response/SKILL.md