WYRE-AI CIPP Security — Conditional Access & Named Locations
Read-only access to a tenant's Conditional Access policy graph and named-location list. Use as input to security posture reviews and to detect tenants drifting from MSP baseline policies. CIPP doesn't expose CA write operations through MCP — apply policy changes via CIPP standards or the CIPP UI.
Anti-triggers
- Creating, editing, or deploying a CA policy — there is no CA
write tool here; policy rollout goes through
cipp-standardsor the CIPP UI. - Who has actually registered MFA — CA tells you what is required,
not what users have enrolled;
cipp_list_mfa_usersincipp-usersanswers the enrolment question. - Defender, secure score, or threat policies for one tenant you hold
credentials for — that is the
m365plugin'sMicrosoft 365 Security; this skill is CSP-delegated and CA-only. - Portfolio-wide posture scoring — comparing tenants against a
baseline template is
cipp-standardsorinforcer-compliance-reporting.
Tools
cipp_list_conditional_access_policies
cipp_list_conditional_access_policies(tenantFilter='contoso.onmicrosoft.com')
Returns every CA policy with displayName, state (enabled / disabled / enabledForReportingButNotEnforced), conditions (users, apps, locations, platforms, sign-in risk), and grantControls (MFA, compliant device, terms of use, etc).
cipp_list_named_locations
cipp_list_named_locations(tenantFilter='contoso.onmicrosoft.com')
Returns named locations: IP ranges (trusted/untrusted) and country-based locations. These are the building blocks CA policies reference for location-based controls.
What to look for in a CA review
| Finding | Why it matters |
|---|---|
Zero policies in enabled state |
Tenant has no CA enforcement at all — a baseline enabledForReportingButNotEnforced doesn't block anything |
| MFA not required for "All cloud apps" | A baseline policy is missing or scoped too narrowly |
| Policies excluding the entire admin role | Common configuration mistake; admins should require more MFA, not less |
| Trusted location includes home/coffee-shop IPs | Named-location bloat creates exception paths for attackers |
legacy authentication not blocked |
Basic auth bypasses MFA entirely; should be blocked tenant-wide |
| Reporting-only policies older than 30 days | Should have been promoted to enabled or removed |
Workflow patterns
Tenant CA baseline check
policies = cipp_list_conditional_access_policies(tenantFilter)
enabled = [p for p in policies if p['state'] == 'enabled']
mfa_for_all_apps = any(
p for p in enabled
if 'mfa' in p.get('grantControls', {}).get('builtInControls', [])
and 'All' in p.get('conditions', {}).get('applications', {}).get('includeApplications', [])
)
If mfa_for_all_apps is false, the tenant lacks the baseline "MFA for everything" policy that every MSP should ship as a standard.
Portfolio drift detection
Run cipp_list_conditional_access_policies per tenant and compare the policy fingerprint (display names + state + grant controls) against the MSP's golden baseline. Flag tenants where any baseline policy is missing or disabled.
Caveats
- CA write operations (create/edit/delete) are not exposed via MCP. Use CIPP standards (
cipp_run_standards_checkand the standards UI) to deploy policy templates across tenants, or do it manually via the CIPP web UI. - Named locations are a trust amplifier — review them as carefully as policies. A misconfigured trusted IP range can quietly exempt entire networks from MFA.
enabledForReportingButNotEnforcedlooks like coverage in dashboards but enforces nothing. Always checkstate == 'enabled'for actual enforcement.