Jamf Pro Device Compliance
Overview
MSPs use Jamf Pro to prove client Macs and iPhones are encrypted, managed, and still reporting in. Cyber-insurance questionnaires and QBRs ask for these numbers. jamf_backup_check does the fleet scan in one call. The other read tools let you explain individual findings, and a few write tools fix the common ones.
Anti-triggers
- OS versions and app patching: use
jamf-patch-management.
- Lost or stolen device, or wiping a leaver's Mac: use
jamf-device-offboarding.
- Whether backups actually exist: Jamf Pro is not a backup product.
jamf_backup_check reports device-side protection signals only. Check the backup vendor's plugin.
Key Concepts
What jamf_backup_check checks
| Platform |
Code |
Severity |
Meaning |
| Mac |
unmanaged |
critical |
Jamf reports the Mac as not managed |
| Mac |
not_encrypted |
critical |
FileVault NOT_ENCRYPTED or not reported |
| Mac |
encryption_incomplete |
warning |
Only some volumes encrypted |
| Mac |
encryption_not_applicable |
info |
Jamf reports FileVault as not applicable (not counted against compliance) |
| Mac |
recovery_key_invalid |
critical |
Encrypted, and the escrowed personal key is invalid |
| Mac |
recovery_key_not_escrowed |
critical |
Encrypted, with no valid personal key and no institutional key |
| Mac |
inventory_stale / inventory_missing |
warning |
Last inventory report older than staleDays, or none |
| Mac |
checkin_stale / checkin_missing |
warning |
Last check-in older than staleDays, or none |
| iOS/iPadOS |
unmanaged |
critical |
Not managed |
| iOS/iPadOS |
no_passcode |
critical |
No passcode, so data protection is off |
| iOS/iPadOS |
data_not_protected |
critical |
File-level data protection not active |
| iOS/iPadOS |
inventory_stale / inventory_missing |
warning |
Last inventory update older than staleDays, or none |
| iOS/iPadOS |
icloud_backup_disabled / icloud_backup_stale |
warning |
Device reports iCloud Backup off, or last backup older than staleDays |
A device with any critical or warning finding counts as non-compliant. Info findings do not.
Arguments
| Arg |
Default |
Notes |
platform |
all |
all, computers, or mobile_devices |
staleDays |
14 |
1-365. Use 30 for a monthly review. |
maxDevices |
1000 |
Per platform, max 5000 |
computerFilter / mobileFilter |
none |
RSQL, e.g. general.site.name=="Contoso" for one site |
includeCompliant |
false |
Also list devices with no findings |
Reading the result
Each platform block has scanned, totalInJamf, compliant, nonCompliant, findingCounts, and devices. Check two things before you report numbers:
truncated: true means the scan stopped at maxDevices before totalInJamf. Raise maxDevices or scope by site.
- At most 200 devices are listed.
devicesOmitted counts the rest. The counts still cover every scanned device.
The tool never returns recovery keys. Do not try to retrieve one through any other tool.
Common Workflows
Monthly compliance summary for one client
- If the tenant is shared across clients,
jamf_list_sites to get the client's site name.
jamf_backup_check with staleDays: 30 and the site filter.
- Report compliance rate per platform (
compliant / scanned), then findingCounts grouped by severity.
- List critical devices by name and serial with the finding detail.
- Say plainly that encryption and escrow are device protection, not backup.
Explaining one device
jamf_get_computer with sections: ["GENERAL", "DISK_ENCRYPTION", "OPERATING_SYSTEM", "SECURITY", "USER_AND_LOCATION"] shows FileVault status, key validity, last contact, and the assigned user. For iPhones and iPads, jamf_get_mobile_device returns the full record.
Remediating common findings
| Finding |
First step |
Tool (tier) |
checkin_stale on a Mac that is still in use |
Redeploy the Jamf management framework so policies and inventory resume |
jamf_redeploy_management_framework (write) |
inventory_stale on a mobile device |
Ask the device for fresh inventory |
jamf_update_mobile_device_inventory (write, up to 100 ids) |
not_encrypted |
Find the FileVault enforcement policy and check its scope |
jamf_list_policies with contains: "FileVault", then jamf_get_policy |
recovery_key_not_escrowed |
Usually FileVault enabled before the escrow profile arrived. Re-issuing the key is a console task. |
Report it. No tool rotates keys. |
unmanaged on a device the client has retired |
Offboard it |
See jamf-device-offboarding (admin-gated) |
Confirm each write action with the user before calling it. Redeploying the framework and requesting inventory are non-destructive, but they still send MDM commands to client devices.
Ongoing visibility
Create a smart group so the gap stays visible in Jamf between reviews:
jamf_create_smart_computer_group (write) with criteria: [{"name": "FileVault 2 Status", "searchType": "is not", "value": "All Partitions Encrypted"}].
Criterion names match the Jamf Pro UI. Confirm the exact value strings in the client's console before relying on the group.
Gatekeeping
- Everything in the summary workflow is read tier.
jamf_redeploy_management_framework, jamf_update_mobile_device_inventory, and jamf_create_smart_computer_group are write tier.
- Unmanaging or wiping a non-compliant device is admin-gated in Conduit and off by default in the sidecar. See
jamf-device-offboarding.
Gotchas
- A Mac with both
checkin_stale and inventory_stale is usually powered off, in a drawer, or with a user on leave. Ask the client before redeploying the framework or treating it as broken.
- A Mac can report
BOOT_ENCRYPTED (boot volume only). The check counts that as encrypted.
- iCloud Backup state is self-reported by iOS. A managed Apple Account or MDM restriction can legitimately disable it, so treat
icloud_backup_disabled as a question for the client, not a failure.
1---2name: jamf-pro-device-compliance3description: >4 Fleet compliance review for Jamf Pro: what jamf_backup_check measures on5 Macs (FileVault, recovery key escrow, managed state, inventory and check-in6 age) and iOS/iPadOS (passcode, data protection, device-reported iCloud7 Backup), its finding codes and severities, drilling into single devices,8 safe remediation with the write-tier tools, and smart groups for ongoing9 visibility.10when_to_use: >-11 When reviewing whether a client's Apple devices are encrypted, managed, and12 checking in, or preparing a security or compliance section for a QBR. Use13 when: filevault status, recovery key escrow, unencrypted macs, stale macs,14 devices not checking in, jamf compliance, iphone passcode, mdm compliance15 report, jamf backup check.16metadata:17 source: https://skillmd.com/skills/wyre-ai/jamf-pro-device-compliance18---1920# Jamf Pro Device Compliance2122## Overview2324MSPs use Jamf Pro to prove client Macs and iPhones are encrypted, managed, and still reporting in. Cyber-insurance questionnaires and QBRs ask for these numbers. `jamf_backup_check` does the fleet scan in one call. The other read tools let you explain individual findings, and a few write tools fix the common ones.2526## Anti-triggers2728- **OS versions and app patching**: use `jamf-patch-management`.29- **Lost or stolen device, or wiping a leaver's Mac**: use `jamf-device-offboarding`.30- **Whether backups actually exist**: Jamf Pro is not a backup product. `jamf_backup_check` reports device-side protection signals only. Check the backup vendor's plugin.3132## Key Concepts3334### What `jamf_backup_check` checks3536| Platform | Code | Severity | Meaning |37|----------|------|----------|---------|38| Mac | `unmanaged` | critical | Jamf reports the Mac as not managed |39| Mac | `not_encrypted` | critical | FileVault `NOT_ENCRYPTED` or not reported |40| Mac | `encryption_incomplete` | warning | Only some volumes encrypted |41| Mac | `encryption_not_applicable` | info | Jamf reports FileVault as not applicable (not counted against compliance) |42| Mac | `recovery_key_invalid` | critical | Encrypted, and the escrowed personal key is invalid |43| Mac | `recovery_key_not_escrowed` | critical | Encrypted, with no valid personal key and no institutional key |44| Mac | `inventory_stale` / `inventory_missing` | warning | Last inventory report older than `staleDays`, or none |45| Mac | `checkin_stale` / `checkin_missing` | warning | Last check-in older than `staleDays`, or none |46| iOS/iPadOS | `unmanaged` | critical | Not managed |47| iOS/iPadOS | `no_passcode` | critical | No passcode, so data protection is off |48| iOS/iPadOS | `data_not_protected` | critical | File-level data protection not active |49| iOS/iPadOS | `inventory_stale` / `inventory_missing` | warning | Last inventory update older than `staleDays`, or none |50| iOS/iPadOS | `icloud_backup_disabled` / `icloud_backup_stale` | warning | Device reports iCloud Backup off, or last backup older than `staleDays` |5152A device with any critical or warning finding counts as non-compliant. Info findings do not.5354### Arguments5556| Arg | Default | Notes |57|-----|---------|-------|58| `platform` | `all` | `all`, `computers`, or `mobile_devices` |59| `staleDays` | 14 | 1-365. Use 30 for a monthly review. |60| `maxDevices` | 1000 | Per platform, max 5000 |61| `computerFilter` / `mobileFilter` | none | RSQL, e.g. `general.site.name=="Contoso"` for one site |62| `includeCompliant` | false | Also list devices with no findings |6364### Reading the result6566Each platform block has `scanned`, `totalInJamf`, `compliant`, `nonCompliant`, `findingCounts`, and `devices`. Check two things before you report numbers:6768- `truncated: true` means the scan stopped at `maxDevices` before `totalInJamf`. Raise `maxDevices` or scope by site.69- At most 200 devices are listed. `devicesOmitted` counts the rest. The counts still cover every scanned device.7071The tool never returns recovery keys. Do not try to retrieve one through any other tool.7273## Common Workflows7475### Monthly compliance summary for one client76771. If the tenant is shared across clients, `jamf_list_sites` to get the client's site name.782. `jamf_backup_check` with `staleDays: 30` and the site filter.793. Report compliance rate per platform (`compliant / scanned`), then `findingCounts` grouped by severity.804. List critical devices by name and serial with the finding detail.815. Say plainly that encryption and escrow are device protection, not backup.8283### Explaining one device8485`jamf_get_computer` with `sections: ["GENERAL", "DISK_ENCRYPTION", "OPERATING_SYSTEM", "SECURITY", "USER_AND_LOCATION"]` shows FileVault status, key validity, last contact, and the assigned user. For iPhones and iPads, `jamf_get_mobile_device` returns the full record.8687### Remediating common findings8889| Finding | First step | Tool (tier) |90|---------|------------|-------------|91| `checkin_stale` on a Mac that is still in use | Redeploy the Jamf management framework so policies and inventory resume | `jamf_redeploy_management_framework` (write) |92| `inventory_stale` on a mobile device | Ask the device for fresh inventory | `jamf_update_mobile_device_inventory` (write, up to 100 ids) |93| `not_encrypted` | Find the FileVault enforcement policy and check its scope | `jamf_list_policies` with `contains: "FileVault"`, then `jamf_get_policy` |94| `recovery_key_not_escrowed` | Usually FileVault enabled before the escrow profile arrived. Re-issuing the key is a console task. | Report it. No tool rotates keys. |95| `unmanaged` on a device the client has retired | Offboard it | See `jamf-device-offboarding` (admin-gated) |9697Confirm each write action with the user before calling it. Redeploying the framework and requesting inventory are non-destructive, but they still send MDM commands to client devices.9899### Ongoing visibility100101Create a smart group so the gap stays visible in Jamf between reviews:102103`jamf_create_smart_computer_group` (write) with `criteria: [{"name": "FileVault 2 Status", "searchType": "is not", "value": "All Partitions Encrypted"}]`.104105Criterion names match the Jamf Pro UI. Confirm the exact value strings in the client's console before relying on the group.106107## Gatekeeping108109- Everything in the summary workflow is **read** tier.110- `jamf_redeploy_management_framework`, `jamf_update_mobile_device_inventory`, and `jamf_create_smart_computer_group` are **write** tier.111- Unmanaging or wiping a non-compliant device is **admin-gated in Conduit** and off by default in the sidecar. See `jamf-device-offboarding`.112113## Gotchas114115- A Mac with both `checkin_stale` and `inventory_stale` is usually powered off, in a drawer, or with a user on leave. Ask the client before redeploying the framework or treating it as broken.116- A Mac can report `BOOT_ENCRYPTED` (boot volume only). The check counts that as encrypted.117- iCloud Backup state is self-reported by iOS. A managed Apple Account or MDM restriction can legitimately disable it, so treat `icloud_backup_disabled` as a question for the client, not a failure.